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I. INTRODUCTION: THE COURT STIRS THE TEMPEST IN STAUB
“[W]hen Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of
general tort law,” declared the Supreme Court in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.1
The Court so labeled the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act (USERRA), a federal employment discrimination law. The Court
did more than merely label a federal employment discrimination statute a tort
in Staub; it proceeded to import the tort concept of proximate cause as the test
for “cat’s paw” or subordinate bias liability.2 With the “federal tort”
declaration and the importation of one of the most controversial and vexatious
concepts in tort law into employment discrimination law, the Court provoked
an onslaught of solicitous commentary and scholarship about the
“tortification” of employment discrimination law3—including this
Symposium. The proclamation in Staub was not the first time a Supreme Court
opinion had suggested that employment discrimination law has a “tortiness”
quality, nor was it the first time the Court had borrowed tort constructs or
doctrines for use in employment discrimination law. Before Staub, however,
there was little commentary4 and even less consternation5 over the relationship
between tort law and civil rights and employment discrimination law. So, why
all the fuss after Staub?
Several reasons occur to me why Staub touched off a tempest about the
Court’s tort labeling of employment discrimination law and incorporation of a
tort law principle into employment discrimination law. First, the proclamation
in Staub was the most direct statement by a majority opinion of the Court that
1 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011).
2 The Court explained the cat’s paw issue as follows: “We consider the

circumstances under which an employer may be held liable for employment discrimination
based on the discriminatory animus of an employee who influenced, but did not make, the
ultimate employment decision.” Id. at 1189.
3 See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A
Proposal to Let Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447 (2013)
[hereinafter Corbett, Unmasking]; Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, The
Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Sperino,
Discrimination]; Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 U. FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014)
[hereinafter Sperino, Tort Label]; Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment
Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012) [hereinafter Sullivan, Tortifying].
4 See Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil
Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2180–81 (2007) (observing that the
relationship between the areas of tort law and civil rights law was undertheorized and
proposing more migration in the other direction—from civil rights law to tort law to
develop the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
5 See id. at 2120 (positing that some migration between the two bodies of law is
desirable).
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a federal employment discrimination law is a statutory tort.6 Second, the
much-maligned tort concept of proximate cause7 was adopted with little to no
analysis of the appropriateness of the construct for the issue at hand,8 when the
adoption of the principle seemed wholly gratuitous and unnecessary to
resolving the issue.9 Third, both the proclamation and the incorporation in
Staub harkened back to the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision on the causation
standard required by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)—
Gross v. FBL Financial Services.10 In Gross, the Court rejected a less rigorous
standard of causation and declared but-for causation, purportedly drawn from
tort law,11 as the meaning of “because of” in the ADEA. Gross ensconced a
rigorous standard of causation for age discrimination claims. Fourth, we all
were left to wonder after Staub how tort law would next be deployed in
employment discrimination law.
Some scholars thought that the labeling in Staub and the cavalier
incorporation of proximate cause might signal a troublesome perspective on
the part of the Court and a trend in which employment discrimination law is
regarded as essentially indistinct from tort law. Commentators recognized that
the tortification did not emerge full grown in Staub, but rather the seeds of
tortification were to be found in earlier decisions. We looked backward to

6 Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
referred to Title VII as creating a “statutory employment ‘tort.’” Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
7 Proximate cause has fallen into disfavor with many, probably most, torts scholars,
and the term been replaced by limitations based on scope of risks in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM, ch. 6, special note on proximate cause (2010). For further discussion of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts position on proximate cause, see infra note 210. Dean
Mark Grady, in the course of offering a defense of proximate cause for its greater-thanappreciated predictability and cohesiveness, recognized that many believe that proximate
cause is basically incoherent and that its cases either cannot be predicted or that they
illustrate some fundamental disorder of the common law. See Mark F. Grady, Proximate
Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 294 (2002); see also Sperino, Discrimination,
supra note 3, at 6 (quoting a leading torts treatise regarding the disagreement and
confusion about proximate cause); Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 3, at 1459 (“Complaints
about the nebulousness of the concept are numerous and longstanding, and there have been
determined efforts to eradicate it from legal discourse.”).
8 The Court discussed agency principles applied in tort law and then announced that
the inquiry whether the biased supervisor’s animus caused the adverse employment action
by the unbiased supervisor “incorporates the traditional tort-law concept of proximate
cause.” Staub v. Proctor Hosp. 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011).
9 Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 3, at 1457.
10 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
11 Although the majority in Gross did not label the ADEA a federal tort, it cited the
Prosser and Keeton torts treatise in support of its decision to equate the statutory language
“because of” with “but for.” Id. at 176–77 (citing KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)).
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Gross, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,12 and one of us looked even as far back
as McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green13 to examine what influence and effect
tort law has had on employment discrimination law over its fifty-year
existence.14 Staub thus aroused anxiety about escalating tortification and a felt
need to examine the historical record of this phenomenon, even before the
Court began expressly applying the tort label to the discrimination statutes.
The concerns prompted by Staub have not abated in the three years since
the decision was rendered. Most of us think that we have been vindicated in
our concerns by the Court’s decision in University of Texas Southwest Medical
Center v. Nassar,15 in which the Court again talked torts as it extended its
holding in Gross by interpreting “because of” in the antiretaliation provision in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to mean “but for” and signaled that
but-for causation will be required for all statutes using “because of” language.
The Court prefaced its adoption of but-for causation in Nassar with another
declaration regarding the tortiness of employment discrimination law:
It is thus textbook tort law that an action “is not regarded as a cause of an
event if the particular event would have occurred without it.” This, then, is
the background against which Congress legislated in enacting Title VII, and
these are the default rules it is presumed to have incorporated, absent an
indication to the contrary in the statute itself.16

Thus, the trilogy of Gross–Staub–Nassar audaciously proclaims the
escalating tortification of employment discrimination law.17
The importation of tort law into employment discrimination is not
inherently a bad thing. Yet, scholarly commentary on the subject since Staub
has ranged from cautious to suspicious to highly critical. From the outset,
however, we probably should acknowledge that some good could come from
tortification, and it is unlikely that the Court will abandon the notion that it can
and should import tort law into the common law of employment
discrimination.18 A reasonable aspiration may be to persuade the Court and
12 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
13 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
14 See Corbett, Unmasking, supra note 3, passim (contending that the pretext analysis

of McDonnell Douglas is a thinly-veiled version of res ipsa loquitur).
15 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) (holding,
based on Gross, that but-for causation is required to prove retaliation under Title VII).
16 Id. at 2525 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 265).
17 See, e.g., Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1052 (describing the Supreme
Court’s use of tort law to interpret the employment discrimination statutes as becoming
“more robust and automatic”); id. at 1066 (“Together Staub, Gross, and Nassar represent a
shift in the way the Supreme Court uses tort law.”). Professor Sperino organizes the
periods of tortification into (1) the Pre-Tort Years, 1964–1988; (2) the Middle Years,
1989–2008; and (3) the Modern Cases, 2009 to Present. Id. at 1055‒67.
18 I use “common law of employment discrimination” to denominate the vast body of
case law developing theories and principles not expressly provided for in the statutes.
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courts to undertake a more thoughtful and discriminating approach to this
process. Indeed, I do not argue that tort law should never be used to develop
employment discrimination law. Numerous tort principles, with or without
modification, may serve employment discrimination law very well. The
Supreme Court, however, has employed a retrograde view of the tort law
available and deployed it in ways that have resulted largely in a complex and
almost chaotic common law of employment discrimination, which ill serves
the grand objectives of the statutes.
What would best serve the law, after fifty years of discrimination law, is
congressional intervention. Congress needs to examine a voluminous body of
employment discrimination common law and amend the statutes in a
comprehensive fashion. Such an undertaking could set the parameters for the
use of tort law in discrimination law. Although I intend to make the case for a
massive overhaul of the federal employment discrimination laws, I am not at
all sanguine about the prospects for such. Over a period of fifty years,
Congress has not necessarily neglected the statutes, but its primary approach to
developing the law has been to leave it to the courts until it chooses to override
particular Supreme Court decisions, sometimes overriding one at a time,19 and
sometimes dispatching with several at once.20 There is nothing suggesting that
Congress will undertake the kind of comprehensive reform that I think is
warranted. Failing that, it is worthwhile to suggest some guidance for courts to
use in deciding future incorporation and forbearance from incorporation of tort
law.
Part II addresses what it means to label employment discrimination laws
federal torts and what is troubling about the Court’s application of the tort
label and incorporation of tort law without adequate explanation and
reasoning. First, I briefly chronicle the inception and development of the
Court’s application of the tort label to employment discrimination law.
Second, I consider several different concerns with the tort analogy and the
importation of common law and tort law principles. Finally in Part II, I
19 For example, with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123

Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.), Congress abrogated Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
20 The most significant example of such a law is the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.),
which abrogated several Supreme Court decisions. Section 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071, expressly
identifies as one of the Act’s purposes “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate
protection to victims of discrimination.” Another example is the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3533
(codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.), which overturned several Supreme
Court decisions restrictively interpreting the meaning of disability under the ADA. The
issue of congressional overrides of the Court’s statutory interpretation in employment
discrimination law is usefully treated in Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional
Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 860
(2012). The problem addressed by Professor Widiss will be discussed infra Part III.A.
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consider the negative effects that application of the tort label and the
incorporation of tort principles have had on employment discrimination law.
In Part III, I offer two solutions that could ameliorate the problems of past
tortification and could usher in future incorporations of tort law that should
enhance employment discrimination law. First, I make the case that the time
has come for Congress to re-engage in employment discrimination law by
amending and updating the statutes. The Court and courts are creating much
employment discrimination doctrine without adequate guidance from
Congress. Congress can and should “get back in the game” and, in the process,
send a message about the role of tort law in employment discrimination law.
Second, recognizing that Congress is unlikely to oblige, I offer some
guidelines for courts in the incorporation of tort law into employment
discrimination law, which actually are culled from various Supreme Court
opinions that have handled the incorporation issue well or not so well. After
proposing those guidelines, I demonstrate the proposed analysis by applying
the guidelines to a couple of tort principles that could be candidates for
importation into discrimination law.

II. THE TORT LABEL AND THE INCORPORATION OF TORT CONCEPTS INTO
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?
What is troublesome about Staub and the so-called tortification of
employment discrimination law? Is it the mere fact that the Court applies the
tort label to employment discrimination law? Or is it the specific tort concepts
that the Court is importing? Or is it the way the Court goes about adopting it?
For me the answer is “yes, all three.” The most troubling thing about the
Court’s resort to tort law to develop employment discrimination law, however,
is that it is occurring at a juncture in the history of employment discrimination
law when the case law has created a complex and confusing labyrinth of
principles and doctrines, and the statutes have not been adequately amended
and updated by Congress. Against the backdrop of outdated statutes, it is not
clear how much tort law or what tort law courts should import into
employment discrimination law. Moreover, the outdated statutes encourage
importation of tort law or other law to populate a body of law that is still, fifty
years after its inception, loosely defined by lean statutes which provide little
guidance on principles and doctrine.

A. The Tort Label
Some have suggested that there is nothing inherently inappropriate about
the Court or courts resorting to tort law to interpret and develop employment
discrimination law. Professor Sullivan has argued that the negative reaction to
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tort law gives too much weight to our rather artificial categorizations of law.21
As Sullivan puts it, it’s all law, and there are a limited number of concepts to
address each legal inquiry.22 Professor Sullivan finds the real issues of concern
to be what tort law is adopted and whether that law is adequately adapted to
serve the purposes of employment discrimination law.23 While I agree with
most of what he says, I do not find application of “the tort label” by the Court
to be innocuous. I see it as potentially pernicious—more than just introducing
the Court’s borrowing of a tort construct. First, labeling employment
discrimination laws as federal torts indicates a particular perspective about the
discrimination laws that troubles me. Second, the Supreme Court has begun to
use the labeling as the key to importing tort doctrines or principles without
conducting any analysis of whether the tort law is well-suited to employment
discrimination law and whether any adaptations may be needed to make it
function well. The Court calls the employment discrimination laws “torts,”
saying that Congress knew the common law background against which it
enacted the laws, and then chooses a tort principle with little to no analysis.

1. Beginning and Evolution of the Tort Label
Initially, it is worth asking what the Court means when it affixes the tort
label to employment discrimination laws. What is it about the laws causes the
Court to label them torts? The Court provided no explanation in Gross, Staub,
or Nassar, but there is some history worth exploring.
Analogizing employment discrimination law to tort law is not self-evident.
Early in the history of discrimination law not all courts24 and commentators25
agreed that the tort characterization was appropriate or correct. Indeed, the
Supreme Court itself expressed some reticence about adopting common law
principles (agency law) for employment discrimination issues in Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson: “[S]uch common-law principles may not be

21 See Charles A. Sullivan, Is There a Madness to the Method?: Torts and Other
Influences on Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079, 1079‒80 (2014)
[hereinafter Sullivan, Is There a Madness].
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1080‒81.
24 See Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1979):

But simply because the law of tort might be a source to evaluate the loss caused by
discrimination does not necessarily mean discrimination claims should be saddled
with the whole of tort doctrine. The discrimination cause of action is unique. It is not
derived from the English common law of personal freedom, but is rather an outgrowth
of the fundamental principle that everyone should be treated equally without regard to
race, color or, as we have come to realize more recently, sex.
25 See, e.g., Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE
L. REV. 1235, 1242 (1988) (positing that because employment discrimination law is not
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transferable in all their particulars to Title VII . . . .”26 The Court in Meritor
did, however, follow the urging of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to look to agency law for guidance in fashioning the employment
discrimination standard.27
It was Justice O’Connor who became the architect of tortifying
employment discrimination law, beginning with her concurring opinion in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.28 In the course of sorting through torts standards
of causation to choose one for the mixed-motives analysis in her
concurrence,29 Justice O’Connor referred to Title VII as creating a “statutory
employment ‘tort.’”30 However, a majority of the Court did not articulate that
view.
A few years after Price Waterhouse, in United States v. Burke, the Court
considered whether settlement of a backpay claim under Title VII was
excludable from gross income under the Internal Revenue Code.31 To come
within the income exclusion, the legal basis for recovery had to be redress of a
tort-like personal injury.32 The Court majority held that the recovery was not
tortlike and thus not excludable. The majority stated that “one of the hallmarks
of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to
compensate the plaintiff . . . .”33 Title VII, the Court noted, did not permit
recovery for “other traditional harms associated with personal injury, such as
pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other
consequential damages.”34 The Court responded to the argument that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 changed the remedial provisions and thus made Title VII
claims “inherently tort-like in nature,” by explaining that although “Congress’
decision to permit jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages under
the amended Act signals a marked change in its conception of the injury
redressable by Title VII,” that change could not be attributed to the statute
common-law based, causal analysis perhaps should not play as critical a role as it does in
negligence).
26 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
27 Id.
28 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
29 Justice O’Connor’s analysis of tort causation standards will be discussed in detail
infra Part III.B.1.
30 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As Professor
Bernstein chronicles, Justice O’Connor was the primary proponent of the thesis that
employment discrimination law is statutory tort law. Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual
Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 510 (1997) (“[H]er colleagues on the
Court have never effectively refuted Justice O’Connor’s cogent position that employment
discrimination is a tort in all but name.”).
31 United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241‒42 (1992) (ruling on taxability
superseded by statute).
32 Id. at 237.
33 Id. at 235.
34 Id. at 239.
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before the amendment.35 Dissenting, Justice O’Connor objected to the focus
on the types of damages as the key to tortiness, and argued instead that it is the
type of injury that is crucial. Relying on the Court’s having characterized the
Reconstruction era civil rights laws as torts, she argued that “[d]iscrimination
in the workplace being no less injurious than discrimination elsewhere, the
rights asserted by persons who sue under Title VII are just as tort-like as the
rights asserted by plaintiffs in actions brought under §§ 1981 and 1983.”36
Thus, Justice O’Connor reasserted her view expressed in her Price
Waterhouse concurrence that “Title VII offers a tort-like cause of action to
those who suffer the injury of employment discrimination.”37
The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 removed the rationale of
the Burke majority for declining to classify Title VII as tortlike. The enactment
of § 1981a38 made capped compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials
available for disparate treatment claims under Title VII and the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). A strong critic of the tortification of employment
discrimination law, Cheryl Zemelman, expressed her assessment in 1993 that
there had been “a two-decade evolution of Title VII from a public policyenforcing statute, designed to promote employer responsibility, to a
compensatory, tort-like statute, aimed at making victims whole . . . [such that]
the privatization of Title VII has become so complete that once unthinkable
characterizations of the statute now seem commonplace.”39 By the time of
Gross and Staub, the O’Connor opinions in Price Waterhouse and Burke and
the obviating of the Burke majority’s rationale by the 1991 Act had laid a
foundation for declaring the discrimination laws to be statutory torts.

2. Concerns About the Tort Label and Importation of Tort Law
a. Is Employment Discrimination Law Tortlike?
If the employment discrimination statutes are not tortlike, then the Court is
wrong, and labeling them as such may obscure important distinctions between
tort law and employment discrimination law. Over time we would expect this
to result in the distinctions being minimized and discrimination law becoming
more tortlike, perhaps to the detriment of the public policy and civil rights
objectives of discrimination law. In other words, tortification of employment
discrimination law may be a self-fulfilling prophecy that enervates the civil
rights laws.
35 Id. at 241 n.12.
36 Id. at 252 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
37 Burke, 504 U.S. at 254.
38 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012).
39 Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to

Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of
Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 188, 196 (1993).
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We may begin, then, by asking whether the employment discrimination
statutes are tortlike rather than accepting the Court’s recent proclamations as
correct and viewing the laws as they have been shaped in the tort mold by the
Court over the years. The answer is, based on the language of the statutes, “not
necessarily.” What does the Court mean by the tort analogy? Although the
Supreme Court uses the tort characterization principally to refer to a type of
injury (personal injuries) and a type of damages (compensatory damages),
there is much more to tort law. Professor Sandra Sperino argues that the
language and structure of the discrimination statutes does not mimic tort law.40
She explains that the statutes do not use tort terms of art, such as but-for
causation and proximate cause,41 and the statutes do not set forth theories of
discrimination couched in terms of a set of requisite elements.42 For example,
it is black letter law that battery requires proof of three or four elements
(depending on whether consent is classified as a defense): (1) a voluntary act;
(2) intent; (3) a harmful or offensive contact; and perhaps (4) lack of
consent.43 Negligence requires that the following elements be established: (1)
duty; (2) breach; (3) cause in fact; (4) proximate or legal cause; and (5)
compensable harm.44 Courts and factfinders examine tort claims by fitting
evidence into these constructs, determining whether there is sufficient, and
then preponderant evidence of each element. Failure to establish any one of
the requisite elements results in no liability.45

40 Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1070.
41 Id.
42 Id. (“[T]ort law has developed a preference for a small set of central elements that

define each cause of action.”).
43 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 28–32 (2000).
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965); DOBBS, supra note 43,
§ 114.
45 Although this is textbook American tort law, such an all-or-nothing approach is not
the only way to articulate and evaluate claims. For example, a flexible approach to tort law
need not require that each element be established to a certain level of proof but instead may
permit that the elements be considered in interaction. If one element is not established or is
weak, liability may be established and recovery permitted if other elements are very strong.
See, e.g., HELMUT KOZIOL, BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A GERMANIC
PERSPECTIVE 14–16 (Fiona Salter Townshend trans., 2012); Ken Oliphant, Uncertain
Factual Causation in the Third Restatement: Some Comparative Notes, 37 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1599, 1626 (2011) (“The reasoning is underpinned by the theory of a flexible
system developed by the Austrian legal theorist, Walter Wilburg. In a flexible system, a
weakness in a given claim corresponding to one element of liability can be offset by
showing unusual strength relative to another element of liability.” (footnote omitted)). One
manifestation of such an approach is proportional liability and recovery based on
probability of causation. A number of states in the U.S. recognize a version of this in lost
chance of survival claims in medical malpractice wrongful death cases of uncertainty
regarding causation. For further discussion of proportional liability and lost chance
principles, see infra Part III.B.2.
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The language of Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA does not necessarily
lead to the creation of required-element-based theories of discrimination.
Essentially, the statutes prohibit employers from taking adverse employment
actions because of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age or disability.
Such statutes could be interpreted as inviting open-ended and flexible
examination of available evidence to determine whether discrimination has
occurred. However, within the first decade of discrimination law, the Supreme
Court began fashioning proof structures or frameworks that developed the law
along the lines of the inflexible approach of tort law. In 1973, in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,46 the Court announced its now ubiquitous three-part
pretext proof structure, which has been criticized for narrowly cabining
analysis of individual disparate treatment claims—forcing evidence into
artificial categories47 that do not obviously address whether a plaintiff was
discriminated against because of a protected characteristic.48 A plaintiff’s
failure to establish the elements of the stage one prima facie case or stage three
pretext results in no liability. The required elements and the pigeonholing of
evidence is a tort-like approach.49 Other proof structures would be developed
by the Court for discrimination claims, but the McDonnell Douglas pretext
analysis is remarkable for its tort-like analysis and organization of evidence
into categories based on a list of elements. This example of tortification cannot
be pushed too far, as the pretext framework and other proof structures have not
been applied by all courts with the same level of dispositive rigidity in
employment discrimination cases as the requisite-elements approach in tort
law.50 Still, most courts do not diverge from the constraints of the McDonnell
46 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
47 See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks,

93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2324 (1995) (“The claim that we have ‘special’ rules for
intentional discrimination cases creates a false ‘sense of closure’—a false belief that the
law has already taken extraordinary steps to assist Title VII plaintiffs.” (footnote omitted));
Stephen W. Smith, Title VII’s National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Case for the
Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 371‒81 (1997) (exploring whether the McDonnell
Douglas analysis is useful).
48 See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the
New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 57 (1996) (referring to pretext as a
proxy for employment discrimination); Sandra F. Sperino, Recreating Diversity in
Employment Law by Debunking the Myth of the McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 HOUS.
L. REV. 349, 392 (2007) (“[B]oth the federal McDonnell Douglas standard and the similar
state court standards are a proxy for the following statement: These facts are material to
determining whether there is evidence of discrimination.”).
49 I have argued elsewhere that the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis was perhaps
the beginning of tortification of employment discrimination law because it essentially
entailed the sub silentio incorporation of res ipsa loquitur into discrimination law. See
Corbett, Unmasking, supra note 3, passim.
50 Compare, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.
2011) (“[E]stablishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework is not, and
never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment
motion in an employment discrimination case. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s failure to
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Douglas pretext framework, and even among those that do, almost all feel
constrained to at least pay lip service to it. Thus, the courts’ adherence to the
proof structures makes employment discrimination more tortlike than the
statutes require.
The Court’s most significant importation of tort law into employment
discrimination law has been the adoption of tort cause-in-fact standards. The
adoption of tort law’s most basic causation standard, but-for causation, has
made discrimination law look like tort law. The Court based this importation
on the statutory language “because of.” As will be discussed further, this
tortification was not required by the statutory language, notwithstanding the
Court’s declaration in Gross that “because of” means but-for causation.51
Some employment discrimination theories are tortier than others; most
agree that sexual (and other) harassment is the discrimination theory that is
most tortlike.52 The type of injury (personal injury consisting of emotional
distress and dignitary harm sometimes accompanied by physical harm)53 and
the damages awarded (after § 1981a was enacted as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991)54 cast sexual harassment as more tortlike than other employment
produce a comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff’s case.”), with, e.g., Bell v.
Crowne Mgmt., LLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1232 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (“To the extent that
Smith suggests the burden-shifting paradigm of McDonnell Douglas can be ignored in a
case based on circumstantial evidence, freeing the plaintiff from any obligation to establish
a prima facie case, it is in tension with a long line of Eleventh Circuit precedent.”).
51 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009).
52 See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 4, at 2127 (calling “workplace harassment [] the
kind of employment discrimination that looks most like a tort”); cf. Bernstein, supra note
30, at 451 (arguing that the lens of respect “reconciles competing perspectives on fault,
simultaneously recognizing the tort-like wrong of sexual harassment and the Title VII
emphasis on workplace discrimination”); Mark M. Hager, Harassment and Constitutional
Tort: The Other Jurisprudence, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 279, 317 (1999) (“[H]ostile
environment harassment under Title VII dwells in a twilight zone between discrimination
and tort.”).
53 See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 2119 (describing the injury as “a multifaceted
injury—with both a personal and social dimension”). But see Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple
Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 817, 833 (2005) (criticizing
the Court’s view of “sexual harassment as an individual, tort-like injury” because that view
“obscures the relationship between sexual harassment and sex discrimination, both of
which occur because of group-based bigotry”).
54 In many cases of sexual harassment, the original Title VII remedies were largely
ineffectual for redressing plaintiffs’ injuries because there was no adverse employment
action resulting in a loss of pay, for which backpay could provide a remedy. The 1991 Act
made compensatory and punitive damages available. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 102(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a
(2012)). Section 2(1) states in part: “The Congress finds that . . . additional remedies under
Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
workplace . . . .” Id. § 2(1); see also Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in
Employment Discrimination Cases: A Call for Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735,
747–51 (2008) (discussing the congressional response to the limited remedies available for
redressing sexual harassment).

2014]

WHAT IS TROUBLING

1039

discrimination theories. Moreover, sexual harassment law is based on the
requisite-elements approach of tort law. Hostile environment claims require
proof of five elements, as enumerated by most courts, that must be established
in order for a plaintiff to recover.55 One might expect that in this most tort-like
subset of employment discrimination law, and, in this context, the borrowing
of tort would be least troublesome. I think that is correct.
Thus, the employment discrimination statutes do not manifestly create
statutory torts. The Supreme Court, however, has imbued the common law of
discrimination with tort characteristics, and Congress accentuated that with the
1991 Act’s addition of compensatory and punitive damages.56

b. Reservations About Importation of Common Law Principles
There is a common law of torts. There also is and always will be a
common law of employment discrimination, created as the Court and courts
interpret the statutes. The common law of employment discrimination,
however, should be constrained by the statutes based on a respect for the roles
of the judicial and legislative branches.57 Courts should approach the
migration of tort principles into employment discrimination law with caution
and restraint rather than with the current promiscuity. A cautious approach is
appropriate because tort law is primarily common law and employment
discrimination law is principally statutory.58 Although this seems a mere
truism, it suggests reasons for a careful and analytical approach to importation
of tort common law—an approach that includes consideration of adoption only
55 The elements are generally stated along the following lines: (1) that he or she
belongs to a protected group; (2) that the employee has been subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment, such as sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other conduct of a
sexual nature; (3) that the harassment must have been based on the sex of the employee; (4)
that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) a basis for
holding the employer liable. See, e.g., Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d
798, 807 (11th Cir. 2010); Green v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 655 (5th
Cir. 2002).
56 I wish to be clear that I do not think that the addition of compensatory and punitive
damages and jury trials in the 1991 Act was a bad thing. On the contrary, I think it was
needed. However, it removed the only ground of distinction between tort and employment
discrimination relied on by the Court in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241‒42
(1992) (ruling on taxability superseded by statute).
57 See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 20, at 860 (discussing the proper roles of the courts
and Congress in lawmaking); cf. Sullivan, Is There a Madness, supra note 21, at 1083
(explaining that resort to other bodies of law to interpret the employment discrimination
statutes is permissible “only when Congress has not carefully enough defined the
parameters of the inquiry”).
58 Although there is a large body of common law of employment discrimination, the
law was created by statutes, and the statutes must be read and interpreted to create the
common law. See, e.g., Sullivan, Is There a Madness, supra note 21, at 1083 (stating that
courts’ resort to tort law or any other law should be constrained by the statutes).
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with appropriate modifications. First, there is a general concern that common
law terms of art and principles are not always appropriate for various statutory
tasks. Second, there is a specific concern that the common law of employment,
which includes contract and tort law, is dominated by employment at will, a
principle that is in tension with the employment discrimination statutes.
The common law has different baselines and norms than the employment
discrimination laws.59 Some baselines of the common law of employment are
the following: (1) neutrality or freedom of contract, meaning government
should leave private contracting parties to their personal preferences; (2)
minimal interference, meaning the economy functions best with minimal
government interference; and (3) protection of employers’ property rights as
owners against the competing claims of employees.60 Professors Theodore
Blumoff and Harold Lewis, Jr., in 1990 criticized the Supreme Court for
adopting common law causation standards that are ill-suited for the statutory
tasks. The Supreme Court’s development of the law since 1990 has
exacerbated the problem of common law baselines for development of
statutory law, as will be discussed below regarding the causation debacle.61
Beyond general reservations about common law principles being adopted
for statutory work, there is a specific concern about the common law of
employment law. The “elephant in the room” of the common law is
employment at will.62 Employment at will is the basic governing principle63
for employment termination in forty-nine of fifty states.64 Employment at will
provides that, absent contractual, statutory, or other restrictions, an employer
can fire an employee for any reason (often stated as “good reason, bad reason,
or no reason at all”).65 Employment at will is a longstanding, deeply
59 See Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal
Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 936–56 (1989)
(identifying the first and third baselines); Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The
Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1, 5 (1990) (identifying two of three baselines).
60 See Blumoff & Lewis, Jr., supra note 59, at 66–70.
61 See infra Part II.B.
62 See Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1068.
63 It often is referred to as a default rule or a rebuttable presumption. See, e.g., Rachel
Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4–5, 13
(2010); J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal
to De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 349–50 (1995).
64 Forty-nine states are characterized as employment-at-will states. The Montana
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987 removed that state from the list,
although weakly. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (2012).
65 See, e.g., Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884) (“All may
dismiss their employe[e]s at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.”), overruled on
other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915); see also Cynthia L.
Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1655
(1996) (stating that it is the “employer’s presumptive right to fire employees at will—for
good reason, for bad reason, or for no reason at all”).
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entrenched, and fundamental principle of employment law in the United
States.66 When employees are terminated, many believe their termination is
wrongful or unjustified. They experience it as a personal injury, and many
want to sue their former employer for “wrongful termination” or “wrongful
discharge.” Yet, in a nation dominated by employment at will, few plaintiffs
can assert viable claims for wrongful discharge. However, plaintiffs who can
allege terminations because of race, sex, age, etc. under the employment
discrimination laws often have viable claims. Thus, the most significant source
of legal protection against unjust termination in the United States is the
employment discrimination laws. Employment discrimination law necessarily
impinged on employment at will from the beginning because Title VII
expressly states that discharge is an adverse employment action for which
discrimination is prohibited.67 Over its life, employment discrimination law
increasingly has come into tension with employment at will as the number of
discriminatory discharge claims has increased.68 In the early years after
enactment of Title VII, most claims were based on refusal to hire, but over the
years the majority of claims have become discharge claims. Thus, courts
should hesitantly adopt common law to perform the statutory tasks of the
employment discrimination laws.69 The Court once expressed this view in
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson: “[S]uch common-law principles may
not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII . . . .”70 Before adopting
common law, courts should carefully consider both the influence of
employment at will on the common law and the need to develop employment
discrimination law that adequately displaces employment at will.71
66 See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine
Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 66 (2000) (“To understand the
American system, therefore, it is necessary to understand the doctrine of employment at
will, its fundamental assumptions, and its ambivalence. More importantly, it is necessary to
recognize where that fundamental assumption has shaped our labor law.”).
67 “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer [] to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
68 See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991) (noting that
“[h]iring charges outnumbered termination charges by 50 percent in 1966, but by 1985, the
ratio had reversed by more than 6 to 1”); see also Statutes by Issue FY 2010 – FY 2013,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/statutes_by_issue.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/LC3-J7MV (showing EEOC statistics of large percentage of charges filed
from 2010 to 2013 based on discharges).
69 See Blumoff & Lewis, Jr., supra note 59, at 70 (“At first blush, it seems almost
inherently inconsistent to speak of the survival of common-law economic and political
premises in light of a statutory scheme which, while stopping short of requiring just cause
for discharge, is an undoubted encroachment on the doctrine of employment at will.”)
(footnote omitted)).
70 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
71 Professor Sperino poses the analysis that courts should conduct as follows:
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One may argue, however, that it is not the entirety of the common law that
is dominated by employment at will; rather, it is the common law of contracts
and employment law. However, in the realm of the common law, tort law
interacts with employment at will, and courts generally have subordinated tort
law principles to employment at will. Consider, for example, two tort theories
urged by plaintiffs in termination cases: (1) wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy; and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Both tort
theories routinely are subordinated to employment at will by courts that
express concern about permitting tort law to dilute the venerable employmentat-will doctrine.
Wrongful discharge in violation of public policy could have developed as
a significant restriction on abusive discharges.72 Indeed, if it had developed as
the abusive discharge tort proposed by Professor Lawrence Blades,73 it would
have been a formidable tort counterweight to employment at will. Instead it
has developed as a feckless tort that is barely worth mentioning as a limitation
on employment at will. While most states recognize a tort denominated as
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, it is notoriously hard for
plaintiffs to recover under the tort theory.74 Courts often explain their
constrained development and application of the tort by declaring the need to
preserve employment at will.75
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), or the tort of outrage, is
a tort of general application that was not designed specifically for employment
law or terminations, as was wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
As difficult as it has been for plaintiffs generally to recover for IIED, plaintiffs
in employment cases, particularly those involving terminations, have found
If Congress meant to alter the common law relationship in a significant way, did it
also mean to fully retain common law meanings for core statutory words? If so, which
words and concepts retained their common law meanings and how are these meanings
changed by the limits Congress imposed on employers’ ability to make decisions
based on protected traits?

Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1069.
72 See Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine,
37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 656 (2000) (describing wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy (“WDVPP”) as “[t]he most significant limitation on the employment-at-will
doctrine [that] has arisen from tort law”).
73 See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1423 (1967).
74 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 63, at 392–402.
75 See, e.g., Briggs v. Nova Servs., 213 P.3d 910, 914 (Wash. 2009) (en banc) (stating
that “the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is a narrow exception to
this employment at-will doctrine” and that “[t]he exception should be applied cautiously so
as to not swallow the rule”); Bammert v. Don’s Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 369
(Wis. 2002) (expressing reluctance to broaden the narrow tort theory of recovery because
employment at will is a “stable fixture” of the common law of the state and is “central to
the free market economy”); White v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 837 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing a narrow exception to employment at will).
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courts particularly reluctant to permit recovery.76 As with wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy, courts fear permitting a substantial tort incursion
on employment at will.77 Some courts adopting such a restrictive approach to
IIED have cited a comment in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: “The actor is
never liable . . . where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights
in a permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is
certain to cause emotional distress.”78 Believing that employment at will is a
sacrosanct principle of law, some courts fear that permitting recovery for one
termination case under IIED will open the floodgates and jeopardize
employment at will.79
Beyond the two tort theories of recovery that have proven ineffectual in
the teeth of employment at will, various tort principles have succumbed. For
example, in Quebedeaux v. Dow Chemical Co.,80 the Supreme Court of
Louisiana considered the case of an employee who was claiming damages for
a battery by a co-employee. The plaintiff was fired for his involvement in the
altercation, and he claimed damages for the battery he suffered. Although his
physical harm was minimal, he claimed damages from the termination,
including lost future wages and benefits. The court of appeals had permitted
recovery under the tort principle of extended liability. For intentional torts,
plaintiffs may recover all damages flowing from the tort, regardless of
foreseeability.81 The state supreme court recognized the tension between the
extended liability principle of tort law and the employment-at-will doctrine
and resolved it in favor of employment at will: “[V]ictim compensation, which
is one of the primary policies supporting vicarious liability, must give way to
76 Interestingly, the first major criticism of the tortification of employment law was a
criticism of the tort theory of IIED being used in the employment context. See Dennis P.
Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case
Against “Tortification” of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 392 (1994).
77 In 1994, Professor Duffy declared that “the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
either do not recognize the tort in the employment at will context, or place severe
restrictions on liability in that context.” Id. at 391; see also Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Private Employment Sector, 21 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 157–58 (2003) (describing reluctance of courts to permit IIED to be
used as a backdoor wrongful discharge claim); Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the
Role of the Collateral Torts in Wrongful Termination Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1693,
1702 (1996) (“Despite the apparent openness of the tort, infliction claims by employees
rarely succeed.”). Although there has been some expansion of application of IIED to
terminations in some states since Duffy’s statement, there is still considerable reticence on
the part of courts.
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1965).
79 See, e.g., Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202
(Tex. 1992) (stating “there would be little left of the employment-at-will doctrine” if the
court permitted recovery under IIED).
80 Quebedeaux v. Dow Chem. Co., 820 So. 2d 542 (La. 2002).
81 Quebedeaux v. Dow Chem. Co., 809 So. 2d 983, 989 (La. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d,
820 So. 2d 542 (La. 2002).
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the employment-at-will doctrine, which furthers broader societal policies, such
as maintaining a free and efficient flow of human resources.”82
In thinking about the importation of common law tort principles into
employment discrimination, insight can be gained by considering migration of
principles in the other direction—from employment discrimination law to tort
law. Professor Martha Chamallas chronicled such a migration of law and
encouraged further importation of the law of hostile environment sexual
harassment to develop the tort law of IIED.83 She described it as “an
interpretive process by which courts selectively borrow from the statutory
domain to give more concrete meaning to tort standards.”84 She compared this
migration process to the judicial practice of borrowing safety standards from
statutes and using them to make more precise the standard of care in common
law negligence claims. “The underlying idea is that it is beneficial that
statutory norms find their way into tort law to insure that common law
adjudication reinforces legislative priorities and responds to changing cultural
sensibilities.”85 The converse proposition is not equally strong. When
borrowing from the common law to interpret and develop statutory law, courts
should be careful that they do not misinterpret or frustrate legislative priorities,
as has happened in employment discrimination law, specifically in the use of
tort causation standards to interpret the statutory language “because of.”86
Moreover, Professor Chamallas noted the most important and challenging part
of the importation process: “Once a determination is made that courts in tort
actions may appropriately borrow from civil rights, however, there remains the
difficult question of precisely which concepts should be borrowed and how
much overlap there should be between the two domains.”87 Indeed, it is not the
general principle of migration but the specific importation that merits careful
analysis.
Using again Chamallas’s example of courts borrowing statutory safety
standards for determining breach in negligence claims, courts do not do so
without carefully analyzing whether the statutory standard is appropriate to the
fact situation, whether it adds precision to the common law standard, whether
it was intended to protect the type of plaintiff seeking recovery in the case, and
whether it was intended to cover the type of harm for which the plaintiff seeks
recovery.88 Considering importation from employment discrimination law to
tort law, two insights should inform migration of law in the other direction, the
subject here: (1) the concern should be greater that legislative purpose and
priorities not be frustrated by the importation; and (2) the analysis of which
82 Quebedeaux, 820 So. 2d at 546.
83 Chamallas, supra note 4, passim.
84 Id. at 2183.
85 Id.
86 See infra Part II.B.
87 Chamallas, supra note 4, at 2183.
88 See Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 590–91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 (1965); DOBBS, supra note 43, §§ 134‒38.
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law appropriately may be imported should be at least as careful and
discriminating as it is in the statutory-to-common-law migration.
In sum, courts should be careful when importing tort constructs and
principles to interpret the employment discrimination statutes and to develop
that body of law. Such an approach is necessary because of concerns with
common law doing statutory tasks generally and with the common law of
employment doing the work of employment discrimination statutes
specifically.

c. Reservations About Importation of Tort Law Principles
I think Congress—at least Congress in 1964—would have recoiled at Title
VII being labeled a statutory tort. I hope that Congress in 2014 would object to
the characterization. The label denigrates the different balance of objectives
and policies in tort law and employment discrimination law.89 Although both
bodies of law share some objectives and policies, such as deterring harmful
conduct and compensating injured parties, that does not mean that their
priorities are the same.
Tort law is a big, diverse, complex, and constantly changing body of law
that often is described as incoherent,90 or lacking “a central theoretical
unifying theory, aim, principle, or foundation.”91 When it comes to theoretical
underpinnings and principal objectives, tort law is multifaceted92 and perhaps
schizophrenic, described and animated by different schools of thought,
theories, and objectives. The principal theories about tort law often are
grouped into two schools of thought: the instrumentalist/social utility school,
which emphasizes deterrence and compensation objectives, and the corrective
justice school, which focuses on the moral importance of doing justice
between or among the parties by requiring wrongdoers to correct the wrongful
losses they occasion.93 There are many ways to subdivide the theories and
89 I have made this argument elsewhere. See Corbett, Unmasking, supra note 3, at

461–62.
90 See DOBBS, supra note 43, § 7.
91 See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Apportionment, Victim Reliance, and Fraud: A
Comment, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1043–44 (2006) (explaining that tort law reflects many
influences over time—which is not well explained by a top-down intelligent design
theory—and using Bruce Springsteen’s Mama’s Soup Surprise to illustrate the point); see
also Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1082 (“[T]ort law lacks a consistent unifying
theory or even a manageable menu of theoretical considerations.”).
92 See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513,
578 (2003) (“Tort law is a multifaceted enterprise, so it is no surprise to see that each
theory brings something to the table . . . .”).
93 Green, supra note 91, at 1042 (crediting the late Professor Gary Schwartz with
recognizing that torts includes strands of both corrective justice and deterrence); Jeffrey
O’Connell & Christopher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in Personal Injury Tort
Law: A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick Atiyah, 32
CONN. L. REV. 137, 138–39 (1999) (describing theories of deterrence, compensation, and
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perhaps the objectives.94 Interwoven with these theories and objectives is a
balancing of concern with public versus private concerns. For example, tort
law often aims to improve society, and it seeks to address private wrongs and
private harms.95 I am not undertaking here the ambitious enterprise of
resolving the best theory of describing or prescribing tort law. Torts scholars
have been engaged in that debate for some time. It is sufficient for my
purposes to suggest that the priority of objectives in tort law and the balance of
public versus private concern do not always align with employment
discrimination law, nor should they.
Although tort law and employment discrimination law share the objectives
of deterrence and compensation, the prioritizing or balancing of those
objectives in tort law is uncertain and perhaps variable depending on the
particular facts or pocket of tort law (for example, toxic torts compared with
battery of an individual), whereas Congress and the Supreme Court have been
clear that deterrence is the preeminent objective of the federal employment
discrimination laws. The Supreme Court and other courts have declared this
priority,96 and Congress has indicated the same in both Title VII as originally
enacted and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.97 A focus on deterrence is to be
corrective justice); Anthony J. Sebok, Using Comparative Torts Materials to Teach FirstYear Torts, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 562, 573–74 (2007) (discussing corrective justice and
deterrence theories); Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1083.
94 See Goldberg, supra note 92, at 514–16 (subdividing the theories).
95 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1509–10 (2009).
96 The Court discussed the dual goals of deterrence/eradication of discrimination and
compensation in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413–25 (1975). The Court
identified the “primary objective” of Title VII as “achiev[ing] equality of employment
opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees.” Id. at 417 (quoting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted))). The Court
then went on to recognize that “[i]t is also the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole
for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.” Id. at 418. In her
concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse, after Justice O’Connor applied the “statutory tort”
label to Title VII, she noted the two primary functions of Title VII: the deterrence goal
related to public policy and the compensation or make-whole goal. Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The Third Circuit
eloquently expressed the preeminence of the public policy:
[A]n act of employment discrimination is much more than an ordinary font of tort law.
The anti-employment discrimination laws are suffused with a public aura for reasons
that are well known . . . . A plaintiff in an employment-discrimination case
accordingly acts not only to vindicate his or her personal interests in being made
whole, but also as a ‘private attorney general’ to enforce the paramount public interest
in eradicating invidious discrimination.

Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 514 U.S.
1034 (1995).
97 Before the 1991 amendments, Title VII provided for equitable relief, which
included the possibility of a back pay award, but not compensatory and punitive damages.
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expected of federal statutes that declare the strong public policy of eradicating
invidious discrimination in employment. Although deterrence and
compensation often are both served by a particular outcome, this is not always
the case in torts,98 and—as the remedies available under the employment
discrimination statutes as amended by the 1991 Act indicate—it often is not
the case under the discrimination laws.
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted, the principal remedy
available for employment discrimination claims under the federal statutes
(except the ADEA and Section 1981) was equitable relief, including backpay
and affirmative injunctive relief such as reinstatement.99 Although it is true
that equitable relief, including backpay, can serve the twin goals of deterrence

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012); see also supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text
and infra notes 100–102 and accompanying text. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added the
possibility of compensatory and/or punitive damages in Title VII and ADA cases in which
they previously were not available, but such damages were made available for only
disparate treatment (intentional) discrimination claims, not disparate impact (unintentional)
discrimination claims, and the damages were capped depending on the size of the
employer. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072‒74 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012)).
98 See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie & Bernard Guyer, Injury as a Field of Public Health:
Achievements and Controversies, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 267, 270 (2002) (“Operationally,
however, they may converge (e.g., punishment of wrongdoers or imposition of liability can
achieve preventive effects through deterrence) or diverge (e.g., the risk of tort liability
faced by companies often reduces hazards, but sometimes creates disincentives to disclose
safety information and may thereby retard safety innovation).”); cf. Mark A. Geistfeld, The
Coherence of Compensation-Deterrence Theory in Tort Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 383, 415
(2012) (“[T]he functions of compensation and deterrence do not obviously cohere into a
viable theory of tort law.”).
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see also supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
Race discrimination claims, which could be asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in addition to
Title VII, and age discrimination claims under the ADEA’s different remedial scheme,
modeled on the Fair Labor Standards Act, were the exceptional claims for which damages
were available. Regarding the assertion of race claims under § 1981, see United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 240 (1992) (“42 U.S.C. § 1981[] permits victims of race-based
employment discrimination to obtain a jury trial at which both equitable and legal relief,
including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages may be
awarded.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Regarding the ADEA remedial scheme and
how it differs from that of Title VII because it was modeled on the FLSA, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (2012) (“Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall
be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of
sections 216 and 217 of [the FLSA].”); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584–85
(1978) (“[T]he ADEA incorporates the FLSA provision that employers ‘shall be liable’ for
amounts deemed unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation, while under Title VII,
the availability of backpay is a matter of equitable discretion[.] [R]ather than adopting the
procedures of Title VII for ADEA actions, Congress rejected that course in favor of
incorporating the FLSA procedures even while adopting Title VII’s substantive
prohibitions.” (citation omitted)).
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and compensation, full compensation was not achieved in many cases.100 The
1991 Act added compensatory and punitive damages, subject to caps, for
claims of disparate treatment (intentional) discrimination, under Title VII and
the Americans with Disabilities Act for which damages were not otherwise
available.101 However, such damages were not extended to claims of disparate
impact.102 Thus, compensation took on a more important place in employment
discrimination than it previously had occupied, but only in cases of intentional
discrimination.
The primacy of deterrence over compensation as reflected in the remedies
available is even more clearly demonstrated by another part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 that codified the mixed-motives proof structure in Title VII.103 A
plaintiff pursuing a Title VII claim under mixed motives can recover
compensatory (and perhaps punitive) damages and backpay if the plaintiff
proves that the protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the
defendant employer’s adverse employment action and the defendant fails to
prove the same-decision defense (that it would have taken the same action for
nondiscriminatory reasons). However, if the defendant proves the samedecision defense, which means the employer disproves but-for causation, then
only nonmonetary relief (other than possible attorney’s fees)—not even
backpay or reinstatement—is available.104 Because of the importance of
deterrence, declaratory and some injunctive relief is available upon proof of
less than but-for causation, but the plaintiff receives no monetary
compensation. Congress in the statute sought to achieve the public policy of
deterrence in cases involving a relatively weak showing of causation although
it was not willing to compensate private plaintiffs in such cases. Thus, while
elevating the compensatory objective of Title VII and the ADA, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 maintained the primacy of the deterrence objective.
Although deterrence and compensation both may be served by outcomes under
the employment discrimination statutes, Congress has fashioned the laws to
further the deterrence objective even in cases in which it chooses not to
advance fully the compensation objective.
While deterrence is the primary objective of employment discrimination
law, it is arguable that compensation is at least an equally important objective
of tort law.105 As demonstrated above, these goals do not necessarily coincide

100 See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment
Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 427–28 (1999).
101 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012).
102 See id.
103 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
104 See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
105 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, The Restatement of Torts and the Courts, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1439, 1439 (2001) (“Primarily through tort law the courts compensate those injured
by others. Secondary aspects of our work such as deterrence or forcing tortfeasors to pay
the full social costs of their activities are minor and collateral.”); cf. DOBBS, supra note 43,
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in employment discrimination law. Closely associated with the priority of
objectives in employment discrimination law is the primacy of the public
policy function over the private function.106 If the Court persists in
characterizing employment discrimination law as a tort, it may blur the priority
given to deterrence and public policy in employment discrimination law and
the willingness to advance the deterrence objective for public policy reasons
even when it is not appropriate to advance the compensation objective for
private plaintiffs. This result already has manifested itself in the Court’s
decisions in Gross and Nassar to interpret the federal statutes as not permitting
use of the mixed-motives framework (and its lower standard of causation)
except where expressly provided by Congress. It is important for courts to
understand and articulate the primacy of the deterrence objective and to
recognize that, in employment discrimination law, sometimes deterrence
should be advanced when compensation should not.
A second important distinction that should be maintained between
employment discrimination law and tort law is that corrective justice, which
contends as a major school of thought and objective and theory of tort law, has
a more ambiguous role in employment discrimination. The corrective justice
view of tort law is essentially that “wrongful losses ought to be corrected by
wrongdoers.”107 That is, one party has done wrong to another and caused
harm, and morally the situation ought to be rectified. Arguably, employment
discrimination law includes requirements and permissions that go beyond
corrective justice.108 Corrective justice would not be inclined to impose
liability in several situations in which employment discrimination law does—
probably including failure to make reasonable accommodation and disparate
impact.109 Regardless, corrective justice theorists in tort law generally insist

§ 10 (“Compensation of injured persons is one of the generally accepted aims of tort
law.”).
106 See supra note 96 and accompanying text; cf. Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978) (“[T]he plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to
vindicate ‘a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.’”) (quoting Newman v.
Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968))).
107 See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 93, at 574.
108 See Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 405, 407 (contending that distributive justice is more descriptive of
employment discrimination law because it goes beyond remedying wrongs to achieving a
vision of fairness and equality in jobs); Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil
Rights Protection: An Alternative to Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1,
24–25 (describing antidiscrimination law as going beyond corrective justice “with a
vengeance”). Examples often cited include the requirement of reasonable accommodations
for disabilities and religion and the permissibility of voluntary affirmative action that meets
certain criteria. See, e.g., Suk, supra, at 414–15; Zatz, supra, at 24–25.
109 See Suk, supra note 108, at 426–27, 438 (“[C]ourts tend to reinforce a corrective
justice understanding of the law, which in turn makes courts weak in enforcing disparate
impact, reasonable accommodation, and hostile work environment problems.”).
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upon a strong version of causation as a predicate to permitting recovery.110 As
will be discussed below, the courts’ debate over causation in employment
discrimination law has created the most chaotic and asymmetrical feature of
this area of law.111 Arguing as I do for a lower standard of causation in
discrimination law, I think a principal tenet of corrective justice theory in tort
law fits poorly with employment discrimination law, and I think Congress
indicated this in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, although the Supreme Court in
Gross and Nassar did not so interpret the law. Thus, another aspect of tort law
that does not always fit well with employment discrimination law is the
influence of corrective justice theory.
Employment discrimination is not the only area of the law which has been
saddled with a tort analogy that does not necessarily, or always, correlate well.
Writing about toxic torts and pollution, a commentator expressed concerns
about the appropriateness of tort law to address the problems: “But if the
problem, in fact, is not really a tort at all, those remedies will not only fail to
further tort objectives but will also fail to achieve other vital objectives
relevant to the actual problem.”112 As with employment discrimination, in
toxic torts, causal indeterminacy presents problems for the victims.113
Ultimately, then, calling employment discrimination law a tort fails to
acknowledge a different mix and balancing of objectives between the two
areas of law. Failing to account for this difference is likely to result in a body
of law that is less favorable to recovery than Congress intended.
If I am correct about the meaning of the tort label, why would the Court
use it to suggest that employment discrimination law is primarily about
compensating injury victims? Perhaps the Court thinks that the public policy
of reducing, if not eradicating, discrimination has been largely achieved. On
the other hand, the Court may think that the public policy is unattainable and
the best that can be done is compensation of injured persons. It is hard to say
what the Court thinks, but equating employment discrimination law and tort
law suggests to me that the lofty purpose of discrimination law has been, or is
being, enervated.

110 See, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A
Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 249, 285 (2003) (“[C]ausation for
corrective justice theorists is perhaps the most vital component of the torts action”);
Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 439, 439 (1990).
111 See infra Part II.B.
112 Palma J. Strand, Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to
Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35
STAN. L. REV. 575, 587 (1983).
113 Id. at 584.
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B. What Harms Have the Tort Label and Unreasoned Importation of
Tort Law Caused?
So much for abstract concerns about the tortification of employment
discrimination law based on differences between employment discrimination
law on the one hand and common law and tort law on the other. Although the
Court has only recently begun audaciously declaring that employment
discrimination laws are torts in the Gross–Staub–Nassar trilogy, the process
has been ongoing for many years. Has it caused any real harm to employment
discrimination law? Yes, and the greatest harm has been done by the greatest
borrowing from tort law—cause-in-fact analysis. The incorporation of tort
cause-in-fact standards is a debacle that has rendered the common law of
employment discrimination asymmetrical and chaotic.
Most chronicles of the adoption of tort causation standards begin with
Price Waterhouse in 1989 and move forward to Gross in 2009.114 Nassar is
part of the progression, but it is merely an extension of Gross. Few recent
commentaries dig down past Price Waterhouse for the tortification through
adoption of cause-in-fact standards. Professor Sperino labels 1964–1988 the
“Pre-Tort Years.”115 It certainly is true that the Court did not talk much about
tort law in employment discrimination before Price Waterhouse. The scholarly
criticism of the Court’s use of tort causation standards is not new, however,
and in his 1988 article Professor Belton critiqued the pre-Price Waterhouse
cases in which the but-for causation standard was beginning to emerge.116
Before the tort causation standards had been fully developed and given rise to
the problems generated by Desert Palace, Gross, and Nassar discussed below,
scholars were criticizing the importation of tort causation standards because
they did not accurately describe the actual phenomenon of intentional
discrimination.117 Indeed, this is the point that Justice Breyer made in 2009 in
his dissent in Gross:
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show “but-for”
causation. In that context, reasonably objective scientific or commonsense
theories of physical causation make the concept of “but-for” causation
comparatively easy to understand and relatively easy to apply. But it is an
entirely different matter to determine a “but-for” relation when we consider,
114 See, e.g., Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1055‒67 (dividing the tortification of
employment discrimination law into three periods); Widiss, supra note 20, at 881–900
(tracing the evolution of causation standards from Price Waterhouse through Gross).
115 Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1055.
116 See Belton, supra note 25, at 1258–69.
117 See, e.g., id. at 1242 (positing that “a strong argument can be made that causal
analysis should not be as critical an element in employment discrimination law as it is in
the law of negligence”); Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of an Action
and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17,
92 (1991) (explaining that “human actions cannot be explained within the terms of causal
theories”).
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not physical forces, but the mind-related characterizations that constitute
motive.118

Although early on tort causation standards were explained to be a poor fit
for analyzing and proving the statutorily prohibited acts, it took much more
development of the law before the causation standards would leave the
structure of employment discrimination law in shambles.
The Court sub silentio was laying the foundation of tortification in 1973 in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,119 renowned for its announcement of the
now-ubiquitous pretext analysis for individual disparate treatment claims.120
For several reasons, I think it is important to trace the tortification and causein-fact importation back to McDonnell Douglas, although the Court did not
mention tort law in the case. First, the pretext and mixed-motives proof
frameworks, coupled as they are with particular causation standards and
concepts of single- or mixed-motives, began with McDonnell Douglas.
Although the Court did not suggest a causation standard that it associated with
the pretext analysis in McDonnell Douglas,121 it later would in McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.122 The Court linked the but-for causation
standard to the pretext analysis and developed the related idea that the analysis
was suited to cases in which a single motive, either discriminatory or
legitimate, caused the adverse employment action. Those ideas about the
pretext analysis later would prompt the Court to develop a second framework
in Price Waterhouse with a different causation standard to apply to cases of
multiple or mixed motives. Second, McDonnell Douglas in tort-like fashion
created a series of elements that must be proven to establish a disparate
treatment claim. Finally, as I have argued elsewhere, the pretext framework is
a version of the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,123 although the Court never
labeled it as such.124 For those reasons, I begin the story of the importation of
tort law and the adoption and development of tort causation standards with
McDonnell Douglas.
Although we archeologists of causation standards in employment
discrimination law may disagree on the origin that we select, most agree that
the development of tort causation has arrived at a sorry state. As I said earlier,
the problem is not just one of causation standards, but also the proof structures
118 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
119 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
120 The three stages with shifting burden of production are as follows: (1) plaintiff has

burden of production on the prima facie case; (2) defendant has burden of production on a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; and (3) plaintiff has burden of production on pretext.
Id. at 802–03.
121 See id.
122 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976).
123 See Corbett, Unmasking, supra note 3, at 478–506.
124 See Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1056 (noting that the three-part
McDonnell Douglas test “does not invoke specific tort principles and does not mimic any
particular tort”).
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associated with them and the idea that they apply to single- or multiple-motive
cases. For example, in Gross, the Court declared that because the ADEA
requires but-for causation, the mixed-motives proof structure does not apply to
age discrimination claims. Most lower courts understood that holding also to
signal that the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis may be used for ADEA
claims.125 Thus, the development of tort causation standards in employment
discrimination law is responsible for not just different standards of causation
applicable to different statutes after Gross and even different causation
standards applicable to different provisions within the same statute in Nassar.
That alone would be a very significant problem.126 However, the tort causation
standards are a cause of an even more significant problem fraught with more
uncertainty: After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,127 we have two standards of
causation in Title VII and two proof structures—pretext and mixed motives—
and we have no guidelines as to which applies to any given case. Although this
may seem like a lot of blame to heap upon the causation law, it is all
warranted. Desert Palace held that direct evidence is not required to support a
motivating-factor jury instruction, thus erasing the only basis for deciding
which disparate treatment cases under Title VII are evaluated under the pretext
framework and which are evaluated under mixed motives.128 This problem is
attributable to the development of tort causation law in employment
discrimination law as evidenced by this progression: (1) the Court’s decision
in Price Waterhouse creating the mixed-motives analysis with an uncertain
standard of causation; followed by (2) Congress’s partial override and partial
codification of Price Waterhouse in the Civil Rights Act of 1991;129 followed
by (3) the Court’s decision in Desert Palace interpreting the 1991 Act’s
amendment of Title VII as not requiring direct evidence to invoke the
motivating-factor standard of causation and the mixed-motives analysis.
In sum, I think the most significant problems in employment
discrimination law today are a result of the adoption and development of tort
standards of causation. Curiously, the Court could have and should have
125 See, e.g., Perry v. Batesville Casket Co., 551 F. App’x 987, 989–90 (11th Cir.

2014); Tavernier v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 498 F. App’x 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2012);
Blizzard v. Marion Technical Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 2012).
126 See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 20, at 909–20 (explaining problems that arise with the
extension of the Gross holding requiring but-for causation).
127 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003).
128 There is a copious body of scholarship on the chaos created by Desert Palace. See,
e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII
Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102–03 (2004); Kenneth R. Davis, PriceFixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law,
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 861 (2004); Kaitlin Picco, The Mixed-Motive Mess: Defining
and Applying a Mixed-Motive Framework, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 461, 464–65
(2011); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1613, 1650–51 (2011).
129 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 885–86 (describing Congress’s partial override and
partial codification of Price Waterhouse in the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
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stopped the tortification at Desert Palace. When the Court interpreted the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, it found that Congress had adopted and codified the Price
Waterhouse plurality’s causation standard—motivating factor. Although tort
law recognizes several different causation standards, motivating factor is not
one of them. Thus, Congress in the 1991 Act, reacting to the Price Waterhouse
(primarily Justice O’Connor’s concurrence) foray into causation standards and
tort law, codified a causation standard and a proof framework without tort
analogues.130 The Court could have understood this as Congress’s message
that employment discrimination law should not be so freely analogized to tort
law and instead should be interpreted to provide more expansive protection
and recovery. The Court did not hear such a message, and even if it had, Gross
and Nassar suggest that it would have limited that message to section 703(m)
of Title VII. However, in an alternate universe in which the Court interpreted
the 1991 Act differently, Gross and Nassar may not have been decided as they
were.131
Beyond the tort-causation-standard debacle, it does not seem that tort law
has caused any other substantial harm in employment discrimination law. But
will the Staub adoption of proximate cause create problems? It already has
caused one problem which, somewhat ironically, is interwoven with the
Court’s adoption of cause-in-fact standards. The Court seemingly granted
certiorari in Staub to resolve a split in the circuits on the question of cat’s paw
liability, which arises under all of the employment discrimination statutes. It
seems unlikely that the Court intended to resolve the issue for only one or a
couple of the discrimination statutes.132 However, some courts have
interpreted the Staub standard as applying to only statutes that have the
“motivating-factor” standard of causation that USERRA has.133
Beyond the foregoing issue—possibly adding to the asymmetry in
employment discrimination law on yet another issue—the proximate cause
standard in Staub could be used to prevent expansions of employment
discrimination theories. Professor Charles Sullivan speculates that proximate
cause could be used by the Court to hold that discrimination based on
cognitive bias is not actionable.134 Cognitive bias is a theory of discrimination
based on social research on biases that describes much discrimination as being

130 See Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1071.
131 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 900–08 (imagining development of the law if Price

Waterhouse and Gross had been decided differently).
132 See Lee v. Waukegan Hosp. Corp., No. 10-C-2956, 2011 WL 6028778, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 5, 2011) (“Even though Staub’s holding is not directly applicable here because it
was not an FMLA case, its logic still is[, and] the Staub opinion clearly signaled that it was
painting on a larger canvas . . . .”).
133 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 941 nn.426–33 (citing cases where the courts found
that the Staub factor applies only to statutes that have a “motivating factor” standard).
134 See Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 3, at 1476–80.
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based on the operation of biases of which the perpetrator is unaware.135 After
Staub, the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes136 expressed
skepticism about the theory. Time will tell whether Sullivan’s suspicion about
the future use of proximate cause is correct.
In sum, it is clear that the incorporation of tort law into employment
discrimination law is a cause (even if not a but-for cause) of the chaotic and
asymmetrical state of the law today. Tortification need not be a bad thing for
employment discrimination law, although to date it largely has been. So, how
can good or better tortification be achieved?

III. TOWARD A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE TORTIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
It cannot be surprising that employment discrimination scholars write and
speak disapprovingly of the tortification of employment discrimination law,
given the record to date. However, we must move beyond our aversion and
recommend a better approach for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court, and
lower courts taking their cue from the Court, is unlikely to suddenly denounce
the tort label or analogy. As Professor Sullivan points out, there are only so
many principles to draw on, and tort law is not an inapt place for courts to look
to find principles, doctrines, and constructs with which to flesh out the lean
statutory language of discrimination law.137 Second, there are tort principles
that the Supreme Court has not considered which may work very well in
employment discrimination law and improve the body of law as a whole.
There are even tort principles that might ameliorate the problems in causation.
Thus, rather than futilely try to end the tortification of employment
discrimination law, we would do well to try to reform it.
There are two approaches that could achieve the needed reform. The first
is for Congress to undertake a comprehensive review of the discrimination
laws and to amend them, not just in its usual manner of overriding one or a
few Court decisions with which it disagrees. The second is for the Court and
courts to undertake the incorporation of tort law differently, approaching it
135 See, e.g., id. at 1467–76. There is a large body of scholarship on cognitive bias

discrimination. See, e.g., William T. Bielby, Applying Social Research on Stereotyping and
Cognitive Bias to Employment Discrimination Litigation: The Case of Allegations of
Systematic Gender Bias at Wal-Mart Stores, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 395, 396–97 (Laura Beth Nielsen &
Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005). Dr. Bielby was the expert in the Wal-Mart v. Dukes case who
explained the theory of “social framework analysis.” Bielby, supra, at 395. For early work
on cognitive bias, see generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1161 (1995); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
136 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011).
137 See Sullivan, Is There a Madness, supra note 21, at 1079‒83.
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with caution and due regard for differences between the common law of
employment and statutory employment discrimination law and between tort
law and employment discrimination law. In a perfect world, both of these
approaches would be adopted. Although the legislative approach seems
unlikely, adoption of the judicial approach would help.

A. Better Statutes: Congress Should Comprehensively Review
Employment Discrimination Law and Amend the Statutes
Congress enacted Title VII in 1964,138 the ADEA in 1967,139 the ADA in
1990,140 and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in 2008.141 The
effective date of Title VII was one year after its enactment—July 2, 1965.142
So, in 2015, we have had fifty years of employment discrimination law. Along
the way, Congress has amended the laws. The congressional approach has
been primarily to override Supreme Court decisions with which Congress
disagrees. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 is an example of a law that
overrode one Supreme Court decision.143 Congress also has enacted laws that
138 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
139 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012)).
140 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)).
141 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
142 Title VII was enacted in 1964, but its effective date was July 2, 1965. Civil Rights
Act § 716, 78 Stat. at 266 (stating that the effective date shall be one year after the date of
enactment).
143 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in
scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). In enacting this Act, Congress overrode Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). Id. In Ledbetter, the Court gave a
grudging and strict interpretation of when a timely charge of discrimination alleging
discriminatory pay practices must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628–43. The Court held that the discrete act of a
discriminatory pay practice triggers the running of the 180 (or 300) day charge-filing
period; a charge must be filed within 180 days of each discrete discriminatory act. Id. at
628. The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act overturned the decision by establishing three different
events that constitute an unlawful employment practice and commence the running of the
charge-filing period, thus more carefully tailoring the limitations period to the various acts
of discrimination in compensation. § 4, 123 Stat. at 6. The three events are as follows: (1)
when a discriminatory compensation decision or practice is adopted; (2) when an
individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or practice; or (3)
when an individual is affected by such a decision or practice, including each time the
individual is paid resulting from the decision or practice. Id. § 4(3). The Ledbetter Act
amended Title VII and several other federal employment discrimination laws, as follows:
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (2012); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(3) (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
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overrode several decisions in one stroke and added some features that were not
overrides, such as in the Civil Rights Act of 1991144 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008.145 Half a century into the
development of employment discrimination law, Congress should re-engage
with the law by legislating in a different way. Rather than override one or
many decisions, Congress should undertake an encyclopedic review of
employment discrimination law followed by a comprehensive statutory
overhaul.146 Parliament enacted such a reform of the employment
discrimination law of the United Kingdom in the Equality Act 2010,147 and
that type of reform is now needed in U.S. law. Among other matters, such
reform could correct past tortification errors and set the parameters for future
incorporation of tort law.
Employment discrimination law at fifty years is tumultuous and
asymmetrical, with different standards of causation governing different types
of intentional discrimination claims, different proof frameworks applying to
different intentional discrimination claims, and uncertainty about which
causation standard and which proof framework apply to any given claim under
Title VII. It is so confused that most courts have difficulty deciding whether to
evaluate a motion for summary judgment on a Title VII claim under the
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework or the statutory mixed-motives
framework. Furthermore, if a plaintiff brought an intersectional or hybrid
claim of discrimination based on the combination of age and sex
(discrimination against an older woman),148 would a court apply the but-for

§ 12117(a) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 791, 794 (2012).
144 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
145 Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
146 I urged such an approach in earlier work. See generally William R. Corbett, Calling
on Congress: Take a Page from Parliament’s Playbook and Fix Employment
Discrimination Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 135‒37, 144 (2013); William R.
Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81, 99‒115 (2009).
147 Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, § 149 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpga_20100015_en.pdf. The European Union effected a similar
consolidation in the 2006 Gender Recast Directive, which repealed prior sex discrimination
directives and consolidated them in one directive. See Mark Bell, Gender Identity and
Sexual Orientation: Alternative Pathways in EU Equality Law, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 127,
130 (2012); Xavier B. Lutchmie Persad, An Expanding Human Rights Corpus: Sexual
Minority Rights as International Human Rights, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 337, 355
(2014).
148 Courts have not agreed about whether such intersectional claims crossing statutes
are actionable. See generally Jourdan Day, Note, Closing the Loophole—Why
Intersectional Claims Are Needed to Address Discrimination Against Older Women, 75
OHIO ST. L.J. 447, 461‒65 (2014).
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standard of causation required for ADEA claims after Gross or the motivatingfactor standard statutorily permitted under Title VII?149
Employment discrimination arrived at this chaotic state because of the
way Congress and the Supreme Court have conducted their dialogue about the
employment discrimination laws.150 For example, Professor Deborah Widiss
uses the Court’s decision in Gross to explain what she calls the “hydra”
problem, whereby Congress cuts off one head of the Court’s interpretation of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, only to see more such heads grow out in Gross
and its progeny (including Nassar, which had not been decided at the time of
Widiss’s article).151 Through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress seemed
to have solved the Court’s indecision in Price Waterhouse over the appropriate
standard of causation by codifying “motivating factor,”—a non-torts
standard—only to have the basic tort standard of but-for causation grow out
again in Gross and Nassar. Indeed, the but-for heads seem likely to proliferate
for any statute using “because of” or similar language.152 It is the
congressional approach of overrides, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the
Court’s responses to it in Gross and Nassar that produced this state of affairs.
Continuing to pursue this dysfunctional dialogue, override bills were
introduced in Congress as the Protecting Older Workers Against
Discrimination Act (POWADA), first after Gross,153 and then again after
Nassar154—but they were not enacted. Justice Ginsburg in her dissent urged
Congress to override Nassar.155
The back-and-forth of Court decisions followed by congressional
overrides followed by Court decisions interpreting (I think misinterpreting) the
overrides has brought employment discrimination law to its current state. It is
no easy task for Congress to override Court decisions and ensure that the
Court will move in a different direction consistent with the override.156 For
example, the POWADA bills introduced in 2009 included a blanket provision
stating that they applied to any federal employment discrimination or
retaliation law.157 The 2013 bills instead specifically amended the ADEA,
Title VII, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.158 The 2009 bill
approach risks being over-inclusive,159 and the 2013 bill approach risks being
149 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 917 (recognizing this issue).
150 Id. at 881 (explaining “the ongoing conversation between the courts and Congress

regarding the standard of causation in employment discrimination law”).
151 See id. at 877–81.
152 See id. at 909–20.
153 See S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009).
154 See S. 1391, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2852, 113th Cong. (2013).
155 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2547 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
156 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 920–26.
157 See S. 1756 § 3; H.R. 3721 § 3.
158 See S. 1391 § 3; H.R. 2852 § 3.
159 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 925 (explaining that there are disadvantages to
Congress taking a blanket approach).
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under-inclusive.160 Given the track record of congressional overrides, this
approach simply is not a functional dialogue between the Court and Congress
that develops coherent and accessible body of employment discrimination law
that Congress must have intended.
What I propose is that Congress change course and do something
different, radical, and grand. Congress should act like Parliament. It should
reform U.S. employment discrimination law by having a commission with
expertise provide a comprehensive overview of the state of discrimination law
after fifty years and recommend revised employment discrimination law. The
United Kingdom found itself with a three-decade-old body of law, featuring
nine antidiscrimination laws described as “outdated, fragmented, inconsistent,
inadequate, inaccessible, and at times incomprehensible.”161 A research team,
supported by an advisory board and panel of experts, undertook a year-long
study that culminated in 2000 with a detailed report recommending a single
equality act.162 That report was followed by a publication entitled
Discrimination Law Review that reached the same recommendation in 2007.163
Those efforts came to fruition in 2010, with one comprehensive law replacing
the others. The review-and-recommendations stage of this process is crucial
because Congress does not have sufficient knowledge of the problems in the
current state of the law.164 For example, the 2009 POWADA bills expressly
stated that the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework is to be available to
plaintiffs, and the 2013 bills appear to achieve the same result by referring not
to McDonnell Douglas, but to “any available method of proof or analytical
framework.”165 The decision to preserve the pretext proof structure suggests
that Congress may not be aware of or fully appreciate the problems with proof
structures in current employment discrimination law. Given the confusion
created by Desert Palace and a large body of criticism of the pretext analysis,
Congress should at least consider whether preservation of the pretext proof
structure and a two-structure regime is the proper course of action. I am
confident that a body could be assembled and a review produced at the behest
of either Congress or the President.166
160 For example, the Court in Nassar and Gross interpreted the 1991 Act as not
applying to the ADEA and the antiretaliation provision of Title VII. Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2521 (2013); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S.
167, 174–75 (2009).
161 Bob Hepple, The New Single Equality Act in Britain, EQUAL RIGHTS REV., Aug.
2010, at 11, 13, available at http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/bob%20
hepple.pdf.
162 See BOB HEPPLE ET AL., EQUALITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK—REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF UK ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 1
(2000).
163 Hepple, supra note 161, at 14.
164 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 872, 876.
165 H.R. 2852, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(3)(C) (2013).
166 Both Congress and the President have some experience in ordering studies of labor
and employment laws. Congress ordered the Secretary of Labor to study and report on the
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As strongly as I believe comprehensive review and revision of the
employment discrimination statutes is the best course of action for both
repairing the damage from the importation of tort cause-in-fact standards and
charting a course for future migration of tort law, I am not optimistic that it
will happen. First, employment laws, and particularly employment
discrimination laws, are controversial laws—legislators risk votes when they
deal with them.167 Second, in the current political climate, Congress is not
adept at moving major bills, and particularly controversial ones.168 Finally,
both employers and employees and civil rights advocates and opponents likely
would be reluctant to urge Congress to undertake comprehensive review and
reform. Both sides have won some victories along the way, and reform risks
surrendering those wins.169
issue of age discrimination before enacting the ADEA. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964 (1965). A different approach is for the President to appoint a commission. In
early 1993, the Clinton Administration appointed the Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations, better known as the Dunlop Commission for Chair John T.
Dunlop, a former Secretary of Labor. See, e.g., Barbara Presley Noble, At Work; LaborManagement Rorschach Test, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 1994), http://query.nytimes.com/
gst/fullpage.html?res=9501EED61E3BF936A35755C0A962958260&sec=&spon=&pagew
anted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/NNT2-P2H6. The Commission’s charge was to
evaluate what changes should be made in the laws governing collective bargaining “to
enhance productivity, employee participation, labor-management cooperation, and
resolution of workplace problems by the parties themselves.” Samuel Estreicher, The
Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform, 12 LAB. LAW. 117, 120 (1996).
When the Commission delivered its recommendations in December 1994, the proposals
were dead on arrival, coming one month after the Republicans swept into power under the
“Contract with America.” See id. at 121.
167 See Michael Bologna, Hill Watchers Foresee Little Activity on the Labor and
Employment Law Front, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 152, at C-1 (Aug. 9, 2001) (quoting
Deron Zeppelin, director of government affairs for the Society for Human Resource
Management, as saying, “Most members of Congress, believe it or not, do not like to vote
on [employment] issues, period.”). Consider, for example, the tumultuous history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress’s most ambitious revision of the employment
discrimination laws. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); Roger Clegg,
Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV.
1459, 1469 (1994). The 1991 Act was enacted after President Bush’s veto of the similar
Civil Rights Act of 1990, which President Bush had labeled as a “quota bill.” See President
George H.W. Bush, Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval of the Civil Rights
Act of 1990 2 PUB. PAPERS 1437 (Oct. 22, 1990), available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/
research/public_papers.php?id=2345&year=1990&month=1.
168 Consider, for example, the inability to enact an immigration reform bill. See, e.g.,
Chris Opfer, Democrats Want Obama to Issue Orders if No House Action on Immigration
by July 4, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 104, at A-6 (May 30, 2014).
169 Lee Reeves, Pragmatism over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment
Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 558 (2008) (“Any serious effort to
reform employment discrimination laws would necessarily implicate some of the most
sensitive and divisive issues of our times.”).
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However, I remain hopeful that Congress might be up to the task.
Although gridlock seems to characterize Congress now, enactment of the
ADA Amendments Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in
2008 demonstrates that passage of significant employment discrimination laws
is possible. Moreover, though “both sides” may fear bad law as a result of such
a reform effort, the 2008 laws suggest that good reform is possible.
Furthermore, it seems to me that if the sides disagree strongly about an issue,
the likely result is no legislation on that issue rather than very bad law for
either side.170 There are risks associated with a major reform of the type I
propose, but the alternative is leaving development of the law to the Court and
courts, and that has not produced propitious results in recent years.

B. Better Case Law: Courts Should Abandon the Facile Incorporation
of Tort Law and the Lack of Reasoned Adaptation and Engage in
Careful Analysis and Adaptation When Needed
Regardless of our views about the significance of the Supreme Court’s use
of the tort label and resort to tort law to interpret the employment
discrimination statutes, scholars agree that the Court and courts should engage
in a careful analysis to determine which specific tort concepts and principles to
import.171 Moreover, some tort principles may be appropriate but only if
adjustments are made so that the law serves the purposes of employment
discrimination law.172 The careful analysis and adjustment is not happening,
and the lack of analysis is tied to the use of the tort label. The Court majority’s
approach in Gross, Staub, and Nassar has been to use the tort label to justify
the importation of tort law without careful analysis or consideration of
adaptation of the tort law being incorporated. It is important that the Supreme
Court and lower courts undertake careful and “discriminating” analysis
because tort law is going to continue to be applied to employment
discrimination law, and there is some tort law that should, if adjusted
appropriately, improve the common law of employment discrimination.
Indeed, I can envision an employment discrimination law that is greatly
improved by the addition of tort principles, although some such incorporations
may be beyond the courts’ interpretive authority and may require
congressional amendment of the statutes.

170 It is possible, however, that a very muddled amendment or reform may occur, such

as the redefinition/nonredefinition of “business necessity” in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
in which Congress did not define the term in the law. See Note, The Civil Rights Act of
1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 106 HARV. L. REV. 896, 901 (1993).
171 See, e.g., Sullivan, Is There a Madness, supra note 21, at 1080 (“The real problem
for interpreting the anti-discrimination statutes is not that the Court is looking to tort law;
rather, the problems are the Court’s choice of what tort law to look to and its failure to
adapt tort doctrine to the goals of the anti-discrimination laws.”).
172 Id. at 1098–1102.
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1. Examples of the Supreme Court’s Analysis When Borrowing Tort
Law: Gleaning Guidelines
Parts of the Court occasionally have performed a passable analysis of the
tort law being considered, but it tends not to be in majority opinions. Justice
O’Connor performed what I consider an admirable analysis in her Price
Waterhouse concurrence from which I draw most of the guidelines that follow.
This section considers some of the Court’s approaches, good and bad, and
gleans from them some guidelines for how a court can conduct a good analysis
regarding importation of tort law.
Elsewhere I have argued that the Court adopted tort law in McDonnell
Douglas, a version of the res ipsa analysis.173 The Court did not mention res
ipsa and did not suggest that it was adopting tort law. Maybe it did not think of
it as such. Here I will move on to examples in which the Court or some part of
it acknowledges the invocation of tort law. However, I will note that I think it
facilitates good analysis and adjustments to identify the practice of borrowing
from tort law.
As discussed earlier,174 Justice O’Connor is the acknowledged pioneer of
characterizing employment discrimination law as statutory tort law.175 She
also performed the analysis better than anyone else has. In Price Waterhouse
the plurality did untort-like things in developing the mixed-motives framework
for Title VII: rejecting tort’s most basic standard of cause in fact, but-for
causation, as the test for the statutory language “because of”; adopting from
constitutional law a mixed-motives proof structure; and adopting “motivating
factor” as the causation standard for the mixed-motives analysis.176 Justice
O’Connor in her concurrence labeled Title VII a “statutory employment
tort”177 and insisted, agreeing with the Price Waterhouse dissent and the future
majority in Gross, that the statutory language “because of” means “but-for”
causation.178 However, she did not limit her tortification to labeling Title VII a
tort and then using the label as a license to import tort law. Instead, she found
that the statutory language, although requiring but-for causation, did not
prevent dividing the causation analysis into two parts with a shifting burden of
persuasion.179 She resorted to tort law and explained that courts in some torts
cases involving multiple causation shift the burden of persuasion on causation
from the plaintiff to the defendant because requiring the plaintiff to prove but173 See Corbett, Unmasking, supra note 3, at 478‒506.
174 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
176 See Sperino, Discrimination, supra note 3, at 17 (“The Supreme Court plurality

opinion did not purport to draw its test from traditional common-law causation principles,
and it specifically indicated that to equate the causal standard in Title VII as requiring ‘butfor’ cause is to misunderstand it.”).
177 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
178 Id. at 262–63
179 Id. at 263.
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for causation would harm the deterrence function of tort law.180 She
considered the two objectives shared by tort law and employment
discrimination law: deterrence and compensation (making whole injured
persons).181 She settled on “substantial factor,” a tort standard of causation, as
the appropriate standard to trigger the deterrence objective, noting that a lower
standard would not justify a departure from the usual rule that the plaintiff
bears the burden of persuasion.182 When that level of causation is proven, the
employer has the burden of persuasion to prove that it would have made the
same decision. O’Connor found an analogue for that structure already extant in
employment discrimination law in the remedial phase of class action systemic
disparate treatment cases.183 She explained why the mixed-motives two-part
analysis drawn from constitutional analysis was appropriate for analyzing
disparate treatment discrimination claims,184 why the new proof structure was
needed to supplement McDonnell Douglas,185 and why the new structure
would not conflict with other congressional policies embodied in Title VII.186
She further justified the shifting burden of the framework by saying that a rule
that kept the burden on plaintiff to prove but-for causation in all cases would
disserve the deterrent purpose of Title VII.187
Professor Sperino characterizes Justice O’Connor’s concurrence as not
having the “rigid formality” of later cases because she separated the questions
of the causation standard and placement of the burden of persuasion.188 I agree
with that assessment, but I wish to go beyond that and say that the architect of
tortification of employment discrimination law knew how to do it the right
way and demonstrated how to conduct an analysis justifying the incorporation
of a tort principle with appropriate modification. From her concurring opinion,
I glean several guidelines for analysis. First, ask whether the statutory
language permits resorting to tort law and to the particular tort law under
consideration for incorporation.189 The dissent reasoned that the statutory
language required but-for causation, and although Justice O’Connor agreed,
she found room within that requirement to craft a more innovative approach
180 Id. at 263–64 (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1984)).
181 See id. at 264–66.
182 Id. at 265–66.
183 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266.
184 Id. at 267–70 (stating that she “cannot believe that Congress intended Title VII to

accord more deference to a private employer” that the evidence substantially proves
discriminated on a prohibited basis).
185 Id. at 272.
186 Id. at 274.
187 Id. at 278.
188 Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1058‒59 . Professor Sullivan also finds the
approaches of the various opinions to be unobjectionable. See Sullivan, Is There a
Madness, supra note 21, at 1096‒97.
189 See Sullivan, Is There a Madness, supra note 21, at 1083 (“[R]esort to tort . . . or
anything else[], is permissible (in theory at least) only when Congress has not carefully
enough defined the parameters of the inquiry.”).
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that better accomplished the objectives of the law as applied to the facts.
Second, recognize in the analysis the shared objectives of tort law and
employment discrimination law, but emphasize the preeminence of the
deterrence objective in discrimination and ensure that the tort principle
selected serves that objective. Third, explain why the current state of
employment discrimination law is inadequate to address the question before
the court and why resort is being had to tort law. Fourth, examine different
standards in tort law. Herein lies one of the most egregious missteps of the
Court in recent cases: the Court seizes upon a tort principle without adequately
exploring the range of standards, tests, etc. available. Justice O’Connor looked
to a subset of tort law, multiple causation cases, to find the tort standard she
imported. What the Court has done in recent opinions is take a quick glance at
the most basic level of tort law—really, a caricature of a complex and nuanced
body of law.190 Substantial factor was a secondary tort standard of causation
drawn from multiple causation cases, and a shifting burden of persuasion—
which ultimately requires the defendant to disprove but-for causation—was
drawn from the innovative torts case Summers v. Tice and constitutional law.
Thus, O’Connor probed thoroughly in tort causation law and found a standard
used not in the most basic torts cases, but a standard used in tort law to address
precisely the issue she had encountered in employment discrimination law—
uncertainty about causation. The foregoing description of what Justice
O’Connor did in surveying and probing tort law suggests a fifth guideline: a
court incorporating tort law should consider modifications that may be
necessary for the principle, standard, or doctrine to function well and
adequately serve the purposes of employment discrimination law. Thus,
Justice O’Connor did not blithely apply the tort label and adopt the most basic
principle of tort law she could find without adaptation. She chose tort law
addressing the specific problem and adjusted it, with a shifting burden of
persuasion, to satisfy both her understanding of the statutory language
(ultimately requiring but-for causation) and to better achieve the deterrence
function of Title VII (by permitting recovery in some cases of uncertainty
regarding causation). Although Congress subsequently disagreed with the
substantial factor standard of causation in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the
effect of the same-decision defense, that does not detract from the quality of
Justice O’Connor’s analysis. Indeed, I think the better argument is that Justice
O’Connor did the most that she thought the statutory language permitted in
terms of causation standards with both the plaintiff’s prima facie case and the
effect of the employer’s proving, under the same-decision defense, no but-for
causation. Lowering the prima facie case standard of causation to “motivating
factor” and imposing liability even if the employer proved no but-for causation
required congressional amendment of the statute. Moreover, Price Waterhouse
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 constitutes a healthy and productive dialogue

190 See Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1058.
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between the Court and Congress about the state of employment discrimination
law.
The majority opinion in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. provides an
example of a poor approach to tortification,191 and Justice Breyer’s dissent is
an example of a well-reasoned of the rejection of importing a tort principle
into discrimination law. Gross has been criticized on many grounds by many
commentators,192 but I limit the criticism here to the discussion and lack of
discussion of adopting a torts standard. The Court majority brushed aside the
question on which it granted certiorari—whether a mixed-motives analysis
under the ADEA requires direct evidence (essentially whether the holding of
Desert Palace extends to the ADEA)—and decided instead whether the
mixed-motives framework is even applicable to the ADEA. The majority did
not apply the tort label expressly (i.e., did not call the ADEA a tort), but it did
cite a torts treatise, among other sources, in support of its interpretation of the
statutory language “because of” as meaning but-for causation.193 There is no
analysis of the propriety of adopting the tort standard of causation. Perhaps
this is not surprising because the majority repudiates most of what was said in
the Price Waterhouse plurality opinion and O’Connor’s concurring opinion,
saying that if the Court were considering the issue for the first time it might
not adopt the approach194—apparently referring to the approach largely
codified by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Justice Breyer,
dissenting in Gross, urged the Court to consider the difference in applying butfor causation in torts cases and employment discrimination cases before glibly
adopting but-for causation because it is used in tort law.195 He demonstrated
the importance of such analysis, pointing out that but-for causation may
function well enough when applied to the physical forces in torts cases, but it
is likely to be more difficult when applied to determine the causal role of
mental states in employment discrimination.196 This was by no means a novel
critique of why but-for causation is a bad fit for employment discrimination
law,197 but it illustrates an important guideline for deciding whether to import
tort law—consider differences in what is being regulated by the different
bodies of law.198 Those differences may mean that the principle should not be
191 See Gross v. Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
192 See, e.g., Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 858 (2010);

Widiss, supra note 20, at 880 (“Gross has quickly caused widespread upheaval and
confusion . . . .”).
193 Gross, 557 U.S. at 176–77 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 265).
194 See id. at 179.
195 See id. at 191 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196 See id. at 190–91.
197 See, e.g., Gudel, supra note 117, at 88–89.
198 Although Justice Breyer did not discuss it, an additional difference in causation in
tort law and employment discrimination law is that the focus on but-for causation in tort
law is under a negligence theory, whereas the disparate treatment theory of discrimination
to which it is being applied in employment discrimination is based on intent. The question
in negligence is who or what caused the harm. In employment discrimination disparate
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incorporated or that it should be only after modification, as Justice O’Connor
had advocated in her Price Waterhouse concurrence.
Although the Court used the tort label in University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar,199 the case simply extended the holding of Gross to
the “because of” language in the antiretaliation provision of Title VII. The
Court did express concern that interpreting the antiretaliation provision as
having a lower standard of causation would permit many frivolous claims to
survive summary judgment.200 Such reasoning demonstrates the Court’s
fixation on the common law of employment that emphasizes employer
prerogative and control, as manifested in the employment-at-will doctrine.
Nassar is also notable for Justice Ginsburg in dissent calling for Congress to
override the decision. As discussed above, I think Congress should forego
single-decision overrides and overhaul the statutes.
Finally, the Court majority in Staub v. Proctor Hospital201 did a poor job
of explaining why it was importing proximate cause. The Court began by
applying the label: “[W]hen Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the
background of general tort law.”202 The Court was announcing a standard to
resolve a circuit split on the cat’s paw issue—under what circumstances
liability is to be imposed on an employer as a result of a subordinate’s
discriminatory intent being attributed to a supervisor who is the actual
decisionmaker regarding the adverse job action. The Court briefly discussed
agency law before announcing that “[p]roximate cause requires only ‘some
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,’
and excludes only those ‘link[s] that are too remote, purely contingent, or
indirect.’”203 The Court also explained how the proximate cause subsidiary
principles of superseding cause and intervening cause relate to the analysis.204
Interspersed are discussions of intent, including an odd footnote explaining the

treatment claims, we know who caused the harm, and the question is why. A better tort
analogue may be found in the intentional tort pocket. Although the foregoing describes the
state of disparate treatment law in the U.S., discrimination theory need not be focused on
the employer’s state of mind. In the European Union, direct discrimination cases, which are
the analogues of disparate treatment, do not focus on hostile intent. See Bob Hepple, The
European Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 605, 614 (“Unlike
American federal law, liability for direct discrimination (less favorable treatment on racial
grounds) under British and EU law does not depend on establishing a discriminatory intent
or purpose on the part of the alleged wrongdoer. It is sufficient to show that but for the
claimant’s race, he or she would not have been differently treated. The absence of a hostile
intent or the presence of a benign motive for the differential treatment is irrelevant.”
(footnotes omitted)).
199 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013).
200 Id. at 2531–32.
201 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
202 Id. at 1191.
203 Id. at 1192 (quoting Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)).
204 Id.
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intentional tort doctrine of transferred intent, which goes on to say it does not
apply to the facts of the case.205
The Staub Court did provide some analysis to support its adoption of
proximate cause, but it is poor analysis. First, the Court wrote about
intentional torts and causation, never even acknowledging that this blending
would be unusual under tort law.206 When the Court stated that if the dismissal
was not the object of the subordinates’ reports, it may have been the result,207
it seemed to be moving in the direction of the two-pronged definition of intent
in tort law: purpose or knowledge to a substantial certainty.208 Then, it quickly
ventured into negligence concepts of foreseeability and proximate cause.
Although I do not mean to suggest that such a modification of tort concepts
could not be appropriate for discrimination laws, good analysis should explain
the reason for such a modification. Another troubling feature of the
tortification in Staub is that the Court was adopting one of the most amorphous
and troubling concepts in tort law as the standard for what seems a rather
straightforward employment discrimination issue, and proximate cause was a
standard that had received almost no support or mention in the lower courts
before Staub.209 Proximate cause has been deemed so unhelpful in tort law that
the Restatement (Third) of Torts recommends abandoning it.210 Overall, my
criticism of the Staub analysis is that its use of proximate cause seems like a
sloppy description of tort law that does little to support importation of a
concept that has a troublesome track record in its home body of law.
In sum, the Supreme Court or justices, concurring or dissenting, have
demonstrated both good and bad analysis for incorporating tort law into
employment discrimination law. The following guidelines can be gleaned from
the opinions, although this certainly is not an exhaustive list. First, consider
the statutory language and determine whether it permits importation of tort law
and what parameters it establishes. Second, recognize the differences in the
objectives of employment discrimination law and tort law as well as their
similarities; the employment discrimination laws are expressions of strong
public policy and deterrence of discrimination is the paramount objective. This
205 Id. at 1192 n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 435, 435B cmt. a
(1965)).
206 See, e.g., Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1079 (“[T]he causal inquiry is not of
key importance in intentional tort cases . . . .”).
207 Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191.
208 See Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Wash. 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
209 But see, e.g., Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1253 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[A]
plaintiff must show that the allegedly biased investigator’s discriminatory reports,
recommendation, or other actions were the proximate cause of the adverse employment
action.”).
210 The Restatement (Third) of Torts replaces “proximate cause” with “scope of
liability,” explaining that proximate cause is a poor term to describe the idea embodied in
the term. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, ch.
6, special note on proximate cause (2010).
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prioritizing of deterrence and public policy over individual compensation may
lead a court to be less stringent in what it requires of employment
discrimination plaintiffs than tort plaintiffs or to be more rigorous in the
requirements it imposes on employment discrimination defendants trying to
avoid liability. Third, address why the current statutory and common law of
employment discrimination law is not adequate to address the issue. Fourth,
survey in detail tort law relevant to the issue, look for treatment of analogous
issues in tort law (as Justice O’Connor did in her Price Waterhouse
concurrence and the Gross majority did not), consider any alternatives offered
by tort law, and explain why the one chosen is an appropriate choice. Under
this guideline, it is appropriate to consider the performance (track record) of
the principle in tort law. For example, is it among the most controversial and
amorphous principles in tort law, like proximate cause? Is it old tort law that is
being replaced with newer principles? Fifth, consider what differences, such as
mental states compared with physical acts, might render implementation of the
tort principle more problematic in discrimination law. Sixth, if a tort principle
or doctrine seems serviceable, consider what modifications may be needed to
make it work well in discrimination law. No doubt there are other guidelines
that could be harvested from court opinions or other sources, but I think the
foregoing considerations would lead to better analyses and decisions regarding
adoption of tort principles in discrimination law. I do not suggest that courts
should be bound to a mechanical recitation and application of these guidelines.
Given the debacle of causation in employment discrimination law, I almost
would favor a rebuttable presumption that tort law should not be imported.
However, unless and until Congress provides more detail in the statutes, the
common law of employment discrimination is likely to grow and need to
grow, and tort law is not a bad reservoir of common law. Moreover, as I
explain below, there is tort law that could perhaps ameliorate the causation
mess in employment discrimination law.

2. Experimenting with the Guidelines: Considering Possible
Incorporations of Tort Law
My principal project has been to suggest ways that Congress and the
courts can determine under what circumstances and how to import tort law
into employment discrimination law. I do not intend to evaluate all tort
principles that could be imported. However, considering a couple of tort
principles may be instructive. First, the concept of assumption of the risk has
received some attention and consideration in sexual harassment law. I think
that tort concept is a poor candidate for incorporation, and I shall demonstrate
that using the proposed guidelines. The concept of proportional liability, which
the tort law of the United States recognizes in some versions, such as
enterprise liability and lost chance of survival, seems to me to be a promising
candidate to improve upon the morass that is employment discrimination
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causation law, although I have some doubt that the statutory language should
be interpreted as permitting adoption of proportional liability.
Assumption of the risk is a tort doctrine providing an affirmative defense,
barring a plaintiff’s recovery when the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly
encounters a risk.211 The idea has surfaced in sexual harassment law in the
context of workplaces that are sexy, rugged, or—at least in one case—creative.
The idea was raised regarding the Hooters restaurant chain being sued by
several former waitresses for sexual harassment, alleging that the employer
established an environment in which customers felt free to engage in sexual
conduct and talk directed at the waitresses.212 Although I am unaware of a
court that has expressly adopted the defense in such a fact situation, a
California appellate court accepted a version of assumption of the risk in Lyle
v. Warner Brothers Television Productions.213 In that case, a writer’s assistant
for the television show Friends sued for sexual harassment, alleging that she
was required to sit in writers’ meetings preparing material for the shows, and
the meetings were permeated with salacious talk and vulgar jokes while
discussing ideas for story lines, jokes, and dialog for the show.214 The
defendants argued, and prevailed at the appellate court level, that creative
necessity required license to talk about such matters.215 The opinion later was
superseded.216 There is also an idea that a certain level of rough and sexual
talk, and perhaps conduct, must be accepted when one takes a job with a
“rugged environment.”217 For example, in a recent opinion, the Fifth Circuit
decided that a construction worker who was subjected to egregious sexual
conduct and language by his supervisor could establish same-sex sexual
harassment via the gender stereotyping theory in EEOC v. Boh Brothers
Construction Co., LLC.218 The dissent embraced the idea that some vulgar
conduct is to be expected in some workplaces. The dissent satirized the
majority opinion, by drafting an “Etiquette for Ironworkers” memorandum,
and suggested it as a way for employers to avoid liability in light of the
majority opinion.219
211 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965); DOBBS, supra note 43,

§ 211.

212 See generally Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of Risk

Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 1107, 1108‒09 (1995).
213 Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 512 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004).
214 See id. at 513.
215 See id. at 512.
216 See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 94. P.3d 476, 476 (Cal. 2004).
217 See Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 194, 201 (4th Cir.
2000) (rejecting the idea that such a workplace culture is acceptable due to the “rugged
environment”).
218 EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013).
219 Id. at 475 (Jones, J., dissenting).
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There obviously has not been an outpouring of support to adopt
assumption of the risk or its variants in sexual harassment law, but it is a tort
doctrine that could be imported to the most tortlike of all discrimination
claims. How would the type of analysis that I have suggested evaluate the
incorporation of assumption of the risk? First, the statutory language does not
seem to prohibit or constrain adoption of the tort doctrine because harassment
theory is not expressly provided for in the statutes but is largely created and
developed by case law, which is a good reason for Congress to overhaul and
update the laws. Second, consideration of the prominence of the deterrence
objective in discrimination law would support not adopting a version of
assumption of risk even in the face of the argument that the compensation
objective is not as strong because the person took a job knowing what she was
facing. Employers will not be deterred from tolerating sexual harassment in
some types of jobs if they can rely on an assumption-of-the-risk defense.
Indeed, employers might use the concept to insulate themselves from liability
by warning employees at the time of hire that there are risks of harassment
inherent in the job. Thus, the preeminent discrimination objective of
deterrence would be undermined rather than supported by adoption of the tort
concept. Third, current sexual harassment law has sufficient capacity to
address the issue. One of the elements of a hostile environment claim is
unwelcomeness.220 Although many courts do not like this element and
describe welcome harassment as an oxymoron,221 the element provides a way
of analyzing employees’ conduct in the job without importing assumption of
the risk. Moreover, the courts’ misgivings about unwelcomeness militate
against bringing in a related tort concept. Fourth, considering the performance
of assumption of the risk in tort law, it seems to be an antiquated defense, with
some states abolishing it because it can be subsumed within comparative fault,
which may reduce, without barring recovery.222 As will be discussed further
below, the trend in tort law in the United States and much of the world has
been away from all-or-nothing approaches. I do not think an analysis would
need to proceed any further to reject assumption of the risk as a candidate for
importation into discrimination law.
The other tort principle or doctrine that I wish to evaluate is proportional
liability. Thus, we move from consideration of the old and fading tort doctrine
of assumption of the risk to consideration of a modern cutting-edge tort
doctrine. We do not use the term proportional liability generally in the United

220 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2014) (defining hostile workplace as including
“unwelcome sexual advances”); see also supra note 55 (discussing courts’ statements of
the required elements of a sexual harassment hostile environment claim).
221 E.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1008 (7th
Cir. 1994).
222 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 2 cmt. c (2000);
see, e.g., Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123. 1125 (La. 1988).
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States,223 but we are familiar with and accept some subsets—comparative
fault, lost chance of survival, and market share liability.224 More generally,
proportional liability is apportionment of liability for a harm among a plaintiff
and defendants based on either comparative fault or comparative causal
risk.225 It is endorsed by the European Group on Tort Law in the Principles of
European Tort Law.226 Common to both the comparative causation and
comparative fault subsets is the idea that recovery in tort need not be all or
nothing. Comparative fault obviously is well accepted in the United States
with all but about five U.S. jurisdictions having moved from contributory
negligence to some version of comparative fault.227 We have far less
acceptance of and experience with comparative causation. In cases of
uncertainty about causation, proportional liability “impos[es] liability on an
otherwise liable defendant based on the probability that the defendant’s
tortious conduct was a cause of plaintiff’s harm.”228 The American Law
Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Torts does not adopt a general theory of
proportional liability.229
Because I wish to analyze the suitability of proportional causation230 for
employment discrimination law, I am putting to one side the subset of
comparative fault, although I think it is worth considering whether
223 See Michael D. Green, Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in the US, in

PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 343, 343
(European Ctr. of Tort & Ins. Law ed., 2013) (stating that proportional liability is not
defined in U.S. tort law).
224 See id. at 343–44; Oliphant, supra note 45, at 1605–06.
225 See, e.g., Israel Gilead et al., General Report: Causal Uncertainty and Proportional
Liability: Analytical and Comparative Report, in PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL
AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 223, at 1.
226 EUROPEAN GRP. ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: TEXT &
COMMENTARY arts. 3:105, 3:106 (2005)). This acceptance does acknowledge, however,
that the case for proportional liability is strongest when the probability distribution based
on specific facts is limited, and the case weakens as the range of probabilities widens. Id.
art. 3:106, ¶ 15; cf. Michael D. Green, Introduction: The Third Restatement of Torts in a
Crystal Ball, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 993, 995 (2011).
227 See Eli K. Best & John J. Donohue III, Jury Nullification in Modified Comparative
Fault Negligence Regimes, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 945, 948–50 (2012).
228 See Green, supra note 226, at 994.
229 See id.; Oliphant, supra note 45, at 1605–06 (“[N]either the theory, nor the
published work that supports it, is paid much attention in the Third Restatement; nowhere
are the pros and cons of proportional-liability squarely addressed. Instead, the Third
Restatement . . . focuses on only one species of proportional-liability approach—the award
of damages for loss-of-chance.” (footnotes omitted)).
230 I sometimes will use the term “proportional causation” to distinguish the concept
from comparative fault. I realize that the term is objectionable under a theory of
proportional liability that views the standard of causation as remaining the same and the
compensable harm as changing. I find the case more persuasive for a theory of proportional
liability that recognizes a change in the standard of causation. See infra note 231 and
accompanying text.
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comparative fault should be adopted in discrimination law or parts of
discrimination law.231 In the United States, most jurisdictions now recognize a
subset of proportional causation in the lost-chance-of-survival theory in
medical malpractice cases, principally but not exclusively wrongful death.
Tracing its origin to Professor Joseph King’s article,232 a majority of U.S.
jurisdictions recognize some version of the theory.233 It has been suggested
that lost chance could be used in employment discrimination law,234 and one
federal appellate court has—while not holding it applicable—commented
favorably on it in Doll v. Brown.235
How would proportional liability or lost chance fare under the analysis
that I have recommended for evaluating incorporation of tort law into
employment discrimination law? Whereas assumption of the risk was, in my
view, easily resolved as unacceptable, the answer for proportional liability is
far from clear. First, does the statutory language permit such incorporation?
Based on the Court’s limitation in Gross and Nassar of the “because of”
language to mean but-for causation, it seems that the analysis might end here
with the conclusion that the language does not permit the interpretation, except
for the discrimination (not antiretaliation) provisions of Title VII. With
“motivating factor” in Title VII, there is no obvious statutory obstacle to
incorporation of proportional liability (proportional causation) for Title VII.
However, there is an argument regarding lost chance in tort law that might
circumvent the but-for problem in the other statutes. The Restatement (Third)
231 Professor Katz discusses tort law’s comparative fault allocation scheme as a way of

ameliorating all-or-nothing windfalls to either plaintiffs or defendants, but he recognizes
that there is no precedent for a comparative fault regime in employment discrimination
law. See Katz, supra note 192, at 887–88. I think that comparative fault is not as wellsuited to employment discrimination law as proportional causation/lost chance because
often the nondiscriminatory reasons are not fault based, such as when an employer takes an
adverse employment action due in part to economic reasons. Still, a comparative fault
regime that permits assignment of a percentage to the discriminatory reason could achieve
the same result as lost chance. A proportional liability system that permits assignment of a
percentage chance that discrimination caused an action would improve upon the all-ornothing problem of current standards. Although one may argue that the current statutory
mixed-motives analysis is not all or nothing because the same-decision defense does not
avoid liability, it does preclude almost all monetary relief for the plaintiff. Moreover, after
Nassar, mixed motives is likely limited to Title VII discrimination claims.
232 Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1363–70
(1981).
233 See Green, supra note 223, at 362. The first reported judicial decision to adopt the
approach was Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 479 (Wash. 1983) (en
banc).
234 See Paul M. Secunda, A Public Interest Model for Applying Lost Chance Theory to
Probabilistic Injuries in Employment Discrimination Cases, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 747, 784–
91 (advancing a “public interest approach for remedying probabilistic injuries in
employment discrimination litigation”).
235 Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1207 (7th Cir. 1996).
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of Torts and most state courts take the position that lost chance recovery
entails not a change in the standard of causation, but a change in the
compensable harm.236 That is, the plaintiff must prove that a chance of
survival would not have been lost but for the defendant’s breach. For example,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected the argument that lost chance of
survival is a relaxation of the usual tort causation and quantum of proof
standards in Smith v. State.237 The court said:
[A]llowing such recovery is a recognition of the loss of a chance of survival
as a distinct compensable injury caused by the defendant’s negligence, to be
distinguished from the loss of life in wrongful death cases, and there is no
variance from the usual burden in proving that distinct loss.238

While the merit and persuasiveness of this characterization of lost
chance—a different compensable harm, not a different standard of causation—
are debatable, it is a view of lost chance that may render it acceptable even
under the but-for interpretation of Gross and Nassar. Such a creative rationale
for working within the statutory language is reminiscent of Justice O’Connor’s
approach to but-for causation in Price Waterhouse. It also seems to me that a
move toward proportional liability is consistent with Congress’s codification
of a mixed-motives analysis in Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Motivating factor is a standard of causation below but for, and the samedecision defense does not avoid liability, but mitigates the award. My
conclusion on the first guideline of whether the statutory language permits
adoption of proportional liability (proportional causation) is mixed: probably
for Title VII and probably not for the other statutes and antiretaliation
provisions under current Supreme Court interpretations unless lost chance is
defined as a change in the compensable harm rather than the standard of
causation. The uncertainty about the limits of the statutory language causes me
to return to my point that the best way to accomplish development of
employment discrimination law through incorporation of tort law is for
Congress to re-engage and amend the statutes.
Second, is incorporation of proportional liability consistent with
deterrence being the preeminent objective of discrimination law? It has been
argued by one of the proponents of lost chance in U.S. tort law that it improves
the deterrent effect of tort law,239 but that argument is contested.240 At a
minimum, it seems likely that proportional liability—being perceived as a
236 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26

cmt. f (2010) (“[T]here are times when courts recognize new, unusual, or reconceptualized
harms, which change the causal inquiry.”).
237 Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 (La. 1996).
238 Id. at 547.
239 See John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion Tort
Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1063, 1068–69 (1989).
240 See Green, supra note 223, at 344–45.
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lower standard of causation, like motivating factor—would increase the
number of plaintiffs recovering, although the awards under the scheme would
be adjusted.241 If employers knew that there was a greater chance of a plaintiff
recovering some award, would that deter discrimination? A corollary under
current law is whether employers are less concerned with losing cases under
the but-for standard after Gross and Nassar. Although I cannot empirically
support the answer, it seems to me that proportional liability might improve
deterrence because, at a minimum, attorneys advise their employer clients on
changes in the law and what those changes mean. Presumably, Congress had
the deterrence objective in mind when it chose “motivating factor,” a lenient
(plaintiff-friendly) causation standard, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Third, is proportional liability needed because the current state of
employment discrimination law is inadequate to address the issue? Perhaps the
best start to answering this question is that causation is, as explained above,
one of the biggest messes in employment discrimination law. As my answer
immediately above to the first guideline suggests, adoption of lost chance may
not clean up the asymmetry created by Gross and Nassar. However, I think
that proportional liability, if it could be implemented in employment
discrimination, has the potential to displace all other causation standards. The
Supreme Court of Texas, in rejecting lost chance in the most generally
accepted tort context of medical malpractice, explained that it could not see
any reasoned basis for limiting the spread of lost chance to other torts cases
beyond medical malpractice: “[I]t is doubtful that there is any principled way
we could prevent its application to similar actions involving other
professions.”242 I conclude that proportional liability has the potential to
ameliorate some of the confusion and other problems created by the Court’s
development of the causation law in employment discrimination law.
Fourth, in evaluating proportional liability or lost chance in tort law, the
analogue seems at least as good as the other cause-in-fact standards adopted in
discrimination law, although not perfect. The purpose of this lower standard of
causation in tort law is to address cases of uncertainty about causation. One of
the principal criticisms of but-for causation applied to employment
discrimination is the greater difficulty (than in tort law) posed by determining
whether an adverse job action would have been taken in the absence of a
discriminatory motive, as Justice Breyer argued in his Gross dissent.243 The
Summers v. Tice case cited by Justice O’Connor in her Price Waterhouse
concurrence, which she used to support her shifting of the burden to the
defendant to prove no but-for causation, is a case of uncertainty regarding
241 Under the Court’s rationale in Nassar, the Court majority likely would find that a
proportional liability regime would exacerbate the potential for frivolous claims. See Univ.
of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531–32 (2013).
242 Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 406 (Tex. 1993).
243 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); supra text accompanying note 118.
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causation,244 and Congress codified that aspect of the mixed-motives
framework in Title VII. One may argue, as the dissent did in Price
Waterhouse, that the but-for causation standard is preserved at stage two of
mixed motives (the same-decision defense); however, that is not true in the
statutory version which provides for limitation of remedies rather than
avoidance of liability. Regarding a survey that considers the full range of tort
law, causation standards have been borrowed from tort law, and this could be
seen as the next step. Tort law throughout the world245 is characterized by a
movement away from the all-or-nothing approach to recovery.246 This
movement is manifested in the United States broadly in the movement to
comparative fault and more narrowly in the spread of lost chance of survival.
United States tort law, however, has not broadly accepted the concept,
theory, or doctrine of proportional causation, as indicated in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts.247 Although there is an analogous situation of uncertainty
about causation in tort law and employment discrimination law, the general
adoption of proportional liability/lost chance in employment discrimination
would take it beyond U.S. tort law. Given the greater difficulty of proving
causation in employment discrimination, moving beyond tort law on the
causation issue may be justified. Another possibility is for the incorporation of
lost chance in employment discrimination to mimic U.S. tort law—to apply
lost chance to only a particular subset of uncertainty-regarding-causation
cases. Similarly, and based on the O’Connor concurrence in Price
Waterhouse, the motivating-factor causation standard (and mixed-motives
analysis) was limited to cases involving direct evidence. However, that line of
demarcation always was problematic, and it was eradicated by Desert Palace
v. Costa. Thus, a limited subset of uncertain causation cases in employment
discrimination cases does not occur to me. In sum, the consideration of the tort
law analogue and consideration of the track record of proportional liability in
tort law yields a mixed verdict on which way that guideline gravitates. The
close analogy between the issue in the two bodies of law and the general trend
or movement of tort law causes me to think it favors an adoption of some
version of proportional liability.
Fifth, in considering the differences that may make the principle more
difficult to apply in employment discrimination law than in tort law, it is worth
noting that the argument for proportional liability in tort law may be stronger
based on a difference in the wrong addressed by the two bodies of law. As
Justice Breyer argued in his Gross dissent: it is conceptually harder to apply
but-for causation to mental states and acts than physical acts and physical
harm. On the other hand, and perhaps weakening the argument for extension
244 See, e.g., Green, supra note 223, at 356.
245 See, e.g., EUROPEAN GRP. ON TORT LAW, supra note 226, arts. 3:105, 3:106.
246 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey O. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30

VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (1996).
247 See Green, supra note 223, at 343–44; Oliphant, supra note 45, at 1607.
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of proportional liability to discrimination law, in tort law when proportional
liability is employed in a negligence analysis, a wrongful act—a breach of the
standard of care—already has been established and the question is limited to
whether the wrong caused a harm. In contrast, in employment discrimination
law the question of wrongfulness is not separate from causation: an adverse
employment action is not wrongful unless caused by a discriminatory motive.
In this way the “because of” statutory language defining the unlawful
employment practice does state a distinction that makes a difference, perhaps
supporting a requirement of stronger causal connection in employment
discrimination law.
Regarding the sixth factor, I do not have many suggestions for
modification because I have not fully worked through a theory of proportional
liability for employment discrimination law. I will suggest, however, that
given the requirement of causation for a wrongful act in employment
discrimination law and Justice O’Connor’s having worked through these
issues and problems of importing tort causation standards to address
uncertainty regarding causation in employment discrimination, the
proportional liability principle might be woven into the statutory mixedmotives analysis.248 The first stage of motivating factor might be preserved
whereby the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of wrongfulness, and then
the burden shifts to the employer to disprove causation. Rather than permitting
the employer to prove it would have made the same decision for
nondiscriminatory reasons (negating but-for causation) and thereby limiting
the remedies (no money to the plaintiff), the employer could disprove
causation to whatever extent it could, subject to the factfinder’s determination,
and the recovery would be proportional to the level of causation proven. Given
the damage caps in section 1981a,249 proportional recovery could result in
small awards of compensatory damages. This contrasts with tort law in which
such damage limitations generally do not exist. This adaptation of
incorporating proportional liability into the mixed-motives framework would,
of course, require statutory amendment.
As the foregoing examples demonstrate, application of these suggested
guidelines for considering incorporation of tort law into employment
discrimination law does not necessarily yield an obvious answer. For
assumption of the risk, I think the answer is clear, but for proportional
liability/lost chance it is not. Yet, I think the guidelines yield the type of
careful and discerning analysis that is needed to make good decisions. Such
analysis could result in consideration of the full range of relevant tort law and
importation of tort law, perhaps adjusted, that actually both fleshes out and
improves employment discrimination law.
248 See William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment Discrimination Law: Does

the Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
683, 723–24 (2010).
249 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The reaction in the scholarship to the tortification of employment
discrimination law has not been positive, and “tortification” and “tort label”
generally have not been words of praise directed at the Court. The more fully
developed body of tort law has, however, been a source of law for
employment discrimination for many years, and it will continue to be.
Scholars generally agree that the migration of tort law to employment
discrimination does not necessarily worsen the latter. However, the story of
the incorporation of tort causation standards has not been felicitous, and the
recent tales in Gross and Nassar have been particularly bad, exposing the
dysfunctional dialogue between Congress and the Supreme Court about the
development and direction of discrimination law. I have not attempted to
catalogue all tort law that should and should not be imported to discrimination
law. Instead, I have argued that, at the half-century mark in the life of
discrimination law, Congress needs to re-engage in the process in a significant
way, overhauling and updating the laws, much as Parliament did in the
Equality Act 2010. Regardless of whether that happens (and I am doubtful that
it will), I have offered some guidelines for tort migration analysis that the
Court and courts can use to achieve a better quality of analysis, similar to that
conducted by Justice O’Connor in her Price Waterhouse concurrence. On the
hundredth anniversary of employment discrimination law, perhaps scholars
will look back and laud the development and enhancement of employment
discrimination law through the incorporation of tort law.

